Bundesliga Fanatic Top Players

1. Nuri Sahin
Seeing Sahin celebrate the title on the last match day of the season had to be one of the most bittersweet moments for Dortmund supporters.  Sahin had made his move to Real Madrid public a week before the last match day, something that had been speculated on for weeks in advance but did not make the final announcement any less painful. Despite the euphoria amidst Dortmund’s incredible season, the announcement inevitably put an unspoken damper on the celebration.  For a group of players that promised each other that they would stay together this seems to be a real dagger to the heart and the departure of the influential midfielder already has supporters and pundits pondering the possibility of a sophomore slump, especially in the context of their Champions League participation.

Pass-master Nuri Sahin.

As heavy an indictment as that may be it also underscores the degree of influence and status Sahin had on this Dortmund side and among fans.  Sahin has been the heart and soul of Klopp’s Dortmund in more ways than one.  On the pitch, Nuri, as he is referred to by the Dortmund faithful, became the team’s undisputed leader.  From a purely tactical perspective, Sahin was the brains of the operation and organized Dortmund’s game in the truest sense of a midfield general.  Sahin’s football instincts and natural talent helped him dictate games reminiscent of the great Xavi and spearheaded his team’s championship winning campaign.  Off the pitch, Sahin was the spiritual leader of the squad and maintained a strong bond among a group of players that seemed more like a tightly knit circle of friends than a professional football team.  At the end of the day the allure of Real Madrid was simply too strong for Nuri but it does not take away from a simply outstanding season and few would disagree that Sahin’s performance put him above all others in the league.
Sahin was never one to shy away from his competition and the more challenging the task; the more adamant his response.  Prior to the beginning of the season, Sahin was interviewed by German magazine kicker and set the highest possible bar for himself, aiming to become the best “sechser” or “number 6” in the league, surpassing the likes of Mark van Bommel and Bastian Schweinsteiger, who both had phenomenal seasons the year before.  To outperform two veterans, champions league and world cup finalists was never going to be an easy task but Sahin took on the challenge admirably and by the end of the season only one of the three was left standing.
Almost everything went through Sahin on the pitch.  He was the primary link between defense and attack and it was Sahin that would be most responsible for Dortmund’s build up play.  Before his injury at the end of the season no player saw the ball more than Sahin (2625 touches) and therefore it was more or less up to Sahin to decide how the play would be built and whether the best course of action would be to play the ball forward and initiate attacks or maintain possession and play it laterally or back.  That is where the Xavi comparisons come in because Sahin single handedly dictated the tempo of play.  One element of his game that in particular stood out were his vertical passes whose deftness and accuracy resembled that of the Spanish maestro.  His ability to find a player over long distances made Dortmund’s attacks much more quick and efficient.  Sahin was therefore indirectly responsible for many of Dortmund’s goals, completing 71% of his 1779 passes.  And despite playing deep in midfield he still managed a striking 6 goals and 8 assists in the league,

A tearful Sahin waves goodbye to Dortmund supporters.

It is difficult to imagine Dortmund’s historic season without their midfield talisman.  Klopp’s side was just a goal short of equaling Bayern’s 2007 record for least goals conceded in league history.  Coincidentally, Dortmund conceded 3 goals in their last 4 matches, all games Sahin missed.  Had he played, Dortmund might well be celebrating the league’s greatest defense as well.  Sahin’s good technique also made him one of the most potent players on set pieces and a large chunk of his goals and assists came from dead ball situations including a brilliant freek kick against Bayern in the Hinrunde.  In fact, Sahin made scoring brilliant goals and performing in big matches a habit.  Whether it was the games against Bayern or the derby against Schalke, Sahin stepped up his game and led his side to victory.
Time will tell just how much Sahin’s departure will affect Dortmund as they traverse the dangerous waters of the Champions League next season.  Klopp brought in another young talent in Gündogan but whether it is a direct replacement or not or will adequately fill the shoes of Sahin remains to be seen. Many teams are not beyond recovering and at times even improving after losing key players and the same may be true of Dortmund.  That said, no one will ever be able to take away from Sahin one of the best individual performances in some time.
Here is a compilation of Sahin’s stellar performance against Bayern Munich in the Rückrunde.  Dortmund’s win in Munich was symbolic in many ways, putting the final nail in the coffin of Bayern’s title ambitions and emphasizing Dortmund’s arrival as the team to beat. Nuri put in one of the best individual performances of the season.

The Hunter

FC Schalke 04 have been an inconsistent side recently…..going deep into the Champions League last season and winning the DFB Pokal while finishing a pedestrian 14th in the Bundesliga table.  But with their backs against the wall Thursday evening, down to HJK Helsinki 2-0 following the first-leg  Europa League matchup, Klaas-Jan Huntelaar scored four times to lead Schalke to a 6-1 win Thursday over the Finns, advancing Die Knappen to the tournament’s group stage.
This season, Schalke started off on the right foot with a penalty kick victory over Dortmund to claim the German SuperCup, and began the defense of their Pokal crown with an 11-1 thrashing of Baden-based FC Teningen.  But then came the Bundesliga opener, which saw the Royal Blues looking lackluster in losing 3-0 to Stuttgart.  Schalke won its next two Bundesliga matches in impressive style by scoring nine goals and only allowing three, but again looked disorganized losing in their Europa League opener.
The 28 year-old Huntelaar opened the scoring by converting a penalty in the 15th minute of the match, and added another goal ten minutes later.  But the game was still tight as Helsinki’s Teemu Pukki scored his 3rd goal of the series against Schalke and the 52,000 fans at the Veltins Arena had to have been experiencing some fears.

But the Hunter scored twice in the second half, once on a 49′ penalty and again just past the hour mark to push the game to 5-1.  Teenage Greek defender Kyriakos Papadopoulos knocked in a header six minutes prior to Huntelaar’s fourth goal, and then another Schalke teenager, 17 year-old Julian Draxler, finished off the evening’s goal-scoring exhibition in the 82nd minute.
Coach Ralf Rangnick and Schalke management saved themselves a great deal of criticism with Thursday’s win.  After not playing Raul in Helsinki, citing injury fears because of the artificial surface there, the iconic Spaniard was in the starting lineup for the rematch in Gelsenkirchen, as was Jefferson Farfan and Christian Fuchs.  Looks like Raul will be staying in Gelsenkirchen, now that he is cup-tied, after earlier rumors that he was leaving, fueled by his absence last week in Helsinki.  Good news for Schalke and Bundesliga fans, and coupled with their comeback win last weekend in Mainz, the future looks bright for the Royal Blues.


 Schalke on the Move

Both sides came into this match on the back of their first loss in the new campaign.  Dortmund were downed by what has become their “bogey side”, Hoffenheim, while Nürnberg lost to the surging Hannover at home despite outperforming their opponent. Both looked to this match as a way to bounce back after what could easily be considered unnecessary and unexpected losses last weekend.  The home side were still without first choice striker Lucas Barrios, relying on Lewandowski to deputize in his absence, but they did welcome back Marcel Schmelzer and Neven Subotic for the first time this season.  The near record winning backline from last season was complete again.  The rest of the line up remained the same.
Dieter Hecking’s Nürnberg meanwhile were still facing questions about how they would adapt in light of key departures over the summer.  Could they cope with the losses of key players like Gündogan, who lined up against his former team today ironically enough, Ekici and Schieber, or will they struggle after last season’s impressive campaign?  Veteran goalkeeper and captain Raphael Schäfer underwent surgery on Friday and will be sidelined for up to two months, paving the way for the 18-year old Patrick Rakovsky to start his first match.  Hecking also replaced Mak and Esswein with Hegelar and Eigler after last week’s loss.
Dortmund lost to Nürnberg only once in their last 22 meetings (back in 2007) and kept a clean sheet in four of their last five encounters.  In addition, Dortmund went into this match unbeaten at home in the last 17 matches, more than any other Bundesliga side, a good omen if anything. The last time Nürnberg managed a win in Dortmund was over 20 yeas ago so Hecking and his men had it all to do.

Team formations and key movements.

1^st Half – Nürnberg make it hard for Dortmund to settle 

Wollscheid's successful tackles in the first half.

The first half was surprisingly subdued, especially considering that both sides commit to a high energy brand of attacking football.  Hecking set out more cautiously than usual, and understandably so given he was up against one of the league’s mot potent attacks.  The strength of Nürnberg’s 4-1-4-1 formation is precisely its flexibility and ability to adapt quickly in and out of possession.  The third band of players (the four behind the striker) dropped back alongside the anchor Simons to cut out any channels that Dortmund looked to exploit in this match.  The tactic worked and it took Klopp’s players a good 25 minutes to get into the game.  Götze and Grosskreutz had chances early on but none on target, Wollscheid and Simons equal to anything that the defending champions produced.
Rather than “parking the bus”, Nürnberg defended collectively and with a purpose.  That being to intercept and cut out the passing patterns of Dortmund’s front four. Dortmund failed to get a single shot at goal for 20 minutes and did not get their first real chance until the 39^th minute when Lewandowski was denied by rookie goalkeeper Rakovsky after being played through by Grosskreutz.  Nürnberg’s five midfielders gave Dortmund little room to breathe and the more they strangled Dortmund the more Dortmund pushed up, and subsequently made themselves more vulnerable on the counter.  Nürnberg’s best chance in fact came under such circumstance when Hegeler was played through catching Dortmund’s high backline.  If it was not for an onrushing Weidenfeller Nürnberg could have gone into the break with the lead.

Misplaced passes of Dortmund's front four in 1st half.

Nürnberg looked more assured than the hosts in the first half.  Wollscheid had particularly good performance (won 15 of his 18 tackles in the first half) and as a team seemed to have a game plan laid out and followed it through effectively.  Dortmund on the other hand were more scattered and their front four in particular were sloppy in possession with Kagawa rarely involved.  Overall the front four gave the ball away a combined 17 times in the first half with Kagawa completing just 6 of his passes, telling of their inability to hold on to the ball for extended periods or involve their attack effectively.
2^nd Half – Dortmund gets its groove back
The second half was a different story.  It took Dortmund just five minutes to take the lead.  Götze won the ball on the right, played a one-two with Piszczek to get by Pinola and cut the ball into the center where Lewandowski was waiting to put the ball in the back of the net.  Suddenly Dortmund were brimming with confidence and visibly increased the tempo of the game.  Bender and Schmelzer each had a chance around the hour mark while Lewanodwski arguably had the best chance to double the lead after a through ball from Kagawa put him one on one with the keeper only to be denied.

Completed passes from Dortmund's front four in the 2nd half, a far cry from the first.

The game was suddenly a lot more open and Nürnberg had two good chances of their own from a Pinola shot and a header from a corner by Simons soon after Dortmund’s goal.  Despite those chances it was Dortmund that took control of the game and pressed Nürnberg the way they have done so many times last season.  Klopp inevitably replaced Kagawa with Blaszczykowski on 65 minutes.  The Japanese playmaker still seemed to suffer from jetlag from last week’s international and it showed in his performance as he continued to be absent from the game. Götze’s increasing presence in the center of the pitch also paved way for the change and it was now his turn to dictate the match from the middle.
Perisic was brought on for Lewandowski with 20 minutes to go and nearly scored with his first touch after a great Piszczek run down the right allowed Blaszczykowski to send in a timed cross, only for Perisic’s header to bounce off the post.  Interestingly enough, this was the first time that Perisic was used as the forward instead of out wide where he featured throughout pre-season.  Dortmund’s pressure paid off on 80 minutes after Hummels won the ball and laid it off to Groskreutz who stormed forward and a released a shot from outside the box that was deflected past Rakovsky.  The game was all but decided and despite Nürnberg’s strong first half Dortmund found their rhythm in the second and played up to their standards.  Dortmund benefitted from Götze’s switch into the center, providing a focal point and a link up option for the rest of the team.

Match Summary & Statistics (Source: whoscored.com)

Conclusion
Dortmund are now undefeated in 18 matches at home but Klopp admitted after the match that his side had to work hard for it and recognized Nürnberg’s well organized defense.  Dortmund had an uncharacteristic 120 misplaced passes and did not dominate their opponent like they are usually accustomed to.  Hecking on the other hand was happy with his team’s performance despite the loss, saying that a home defeat to the defending champions is not a big surprise.  In the end, both teams were vindicated in a sense.  Dortmund is back to winning ways and Nürnberg continued to prove, even after a loss, that they are still capable of playing well after losing so many key players.

THE CURIOUS CASE OF FC BAYERN: Its Continuing Problems and the Gomez Paradox

Posted on August 11, 2011 by Daniel Nyari

The first match day of the 49^th installment of the Bundesliga came to a close this past weekend and Bayern Munich were at the forefront of the round’s biggest upset.  The 0-1 home loss to Borussia Mönchengladbach was their first opening season loss in 10 years and the first time the visitors had beaten them at home in nearly two decades.  The club that spent a total of 43 million Euros over the course of the summer got off to the worst start imaginable, losing in front of their home crowd to a side that needed a relegation playoff to stay in the top flight. For most pundits, the main talking point was and will remain the continuing defensive problems of the club.  After all, the goal came from a misunderstanding between the two new signings, Manuel Neuer and Jerome Boateng – the two players brought in to iron out those very defensive concerns. In reality, the problem lies much deeper and singling out the defensive errors is criminally glossing over a far bigger issue – namely, the ideological one.
To avoid presenting this as purely a match analysis, a contextual basis needs to be laid out. Against Gladbach, Bayern had more possession, more shots and created more chances, as is almost always the case for Bayern in the Bundesliga.  So what is the problem?  Poor finishing? Bad luck? Bunkering by Gladbach? All these will no doubt be used to describe the result but to really understand why this match was not an anomaly but in fact much of the same, we have to step away from this as a singular event and delve a little deeper.
As such, two primary factors can be outlined: 1. Tactical – or how Bayern’s setup is incongruous to the way they intend to play and instead is inexpedient, and 2. Managerial – the governing element – a continuing stubbornness and subversion of modernization, and its’ subsequent fallout.  This ideological component is the bigger and more important one of course.
For the better part of three years, Bayern have been lining up with a 4-2-3-1, the formation of choice for most big club sides in Europe.  When Louis van Gaal first arrived he set out to instill his own philosophy at the club and part of that meant he had to experiment initially.  He began with a 4-3-3 and eventually settled on a flexible 4-4-2 which eventually evolved into what we see today.  He had his critics from day one but in his first season, van Gaal got Bayern to play a brand of attacking football that, despite its rawness, was able to hold up in Europe.  His philosophy was a retention-based counter attacking game.  The idea was to teach the side how to alternate between a proactive and conservative style of play at will.  He had an ideal midfield pairing of Schweinsteiger and Van Bommel to work with, suited perfectly to that philosophy.  Both were hard working players, good defensively with a very good football IQ.  They alternated continuously between retaining the ball, kickstarting attacks and generally dictating play from the center of the pitch.  Both were of course excellent throughout the season and key in the team’s success.  What also distinguished Bayern that season was its flexibility in attack. Olic and Müller constantly interchanged and played the channels wisely, allowing Robben and Ribery to cut in at will and play their natural game. And although the gameplan isolated record signing Mario Gomez, who remained an auxiliary figure that season, Bayern were creative and unpredictable and had their most successful season since the Champions League win in 2001.
The Gomez Paradox
The following year, van Gaal compromised and used Gomez to spearhead his attack in the new 4-2-3-1. A long-term injury to Olic no doubt played a part in the decision as well.  Gomez went on to have an incredible individual season, scoring 39 goals in 45 competitive matches – a more efficient rate than any other striker in the top four leagues that season.  But to understand the problems inherent in this system we need to take a look at what made Gomez so successful in it.  For one, he was more confident.  After being marginalized tactically in his first season he was motivated to prove his worth but the key element was the modification, not the shape itself as van Gaal toyed with the notion of a 4-2-3-1 in his first season as well, but to make changes within the existing framework.  This meant that Gomez became the reference point of the team.  All attacks were from then on geared towards him.  Fullbacks, when overlapping, would not cut in as they do in most 4-2-3-1 formations but instead cross directly.  The same was true of the two wing forwards, Ribery and Robben.  There was a visibly greater emphasis on wide play and crossing to Gomez and a great decrease in use of the space between central defenders and fullbacks as Olic and Müller thrived on the previous season.
Gomez benefited from similar conditions at Stuttgart where he was likewise the focal point of the side. As a player, he is a bit of an enigma. He doesn’t offer blistering pace of most modern strikers nor is his technical ability a particular strong point. He will often need one or two extra touches to set himself up and his ability to run off the ball does not necessarily suit the formation that was originally devised to play the channels between the fullbacks and central defenders. Still, his nose for goal is extraordinary. His positioning within the box is traditionally predatory and his physique lends itself perfectly to deal with even the most robust of defenders, not to mention he wins most of his aerial battles. Other notable sides that use the same formation use strikers who as fit the above criteria: ‘mobile’, ‘technical’, ‘ability play outside the box’ and so on.  Inter’s Diego Milito under Mourinho was a deceptively technical player, capable of all the above. Eto’o and Pazzini do much the same now. Higuain and Benzema at Real Madrid, Drogba at Chelsea, and Torres in his Liverpool days, Barrios at Dortmund, even Manchester United with Berbatov and Ronaldo all suit the role.

Ronaldo's heatmap as wing forward in a 4-2-3-1.

Di Maria as wing forward in a 4-2-3-1 - Click to expand

Simply put the 4-2-3-1 thrives particularly because there is no direct reference point. It emphasizes its wing forwards cutting in and feeding the channels but the latter are as much attacking outlets as its strikers. The same is evident with the German National Team. With Bayern that is simply not the case. Ribery and Robben are reduced primarily to suppliers instead. For wing-forward whose natural game is cutting in, taking shots, feeding the channels, they are exceptionally passive in this setup. Of course both will occasionally still play to their instincts but by simply looking at match heat maps, it is extraordinary to see just how wide they stay during a game.  On the other hand, when Olic was used upfront instead of Gomez, Ribery and Robben seemed to enjoy much more freedom to roam and play their natural game. Gomez’s inclusion restricted the amount of space notably.  This weekend’s match against Gladbach is the perfect example. Bayern had a total of 27 crosses (24 of the 27 coming from the left flank), a matchday high. The corresponding charts shows Müller crossing an incredible 9 times and his replacement Ribery crossing 5 times in his 30 minutes on the field.
The strength of most elite sides is that there is a variety to their game plans. There is usually your plan A. which a given manager builds his philosophy on and is based on a core set of players and a plan B, or backup, if the former is ineffective – executed to chase games, close games, and so on. Examples are Mourinho’s counter-based sides supplemented by his bunkering/chocking late match tactics, Barcelona’s pressing supplemented by extreme retention, Del Bosque’s use of Torres supplemented by a Llorente substitution and aerial play. Bayern are seemingly void of any alternative to their Gomez centric strategy. On the contrary, there seems to be a severe over-reliance on their primary plan which can be quite simply condensed into “1. Win the ball, play it out wide 2. Cross to Gomez  3. Repeat”. There is absolutely no indication of a greater concept as van Gaal’s first season seemed to foreshadow. Bayern win the ball and drive it forward in hope, not to create space but rather that space will create itself. There is a whimsical desperation to their method, something extremely uncharacteristic of players like Ribery, Robben, and Müller – players we know are capable of far more adventurous play than their Bayern counterparts seem to indicate.

Robben's movement with Olic as striker (vs. Lyon 2010 CL semi final)

Robben's movement with Gomez as striker (2011 CL quarter final vs. Inter)

The use of Ribery around the 60^th minute could have ushered in a new tactical approach but it was clear from his first touch that he was instructed to get the ball wide and cross to Gomez. It is even more startling that in the post-match interview, Bayern coach Jupp Heynckes made the following remark:
“We should have upped the pace and moved the ball wide more often, but we weren’t determined enough to prise apart a team which came here and set out their defensive stall.”

Müller's crossing vs. Gladbach.

When crossing 20+ times failed to work, the next best thing is to cross even more. This, I claim, is where the club’s major problem lies – choosing the proverbial blue pill over the red pill or subverting the reality in front of their faces and substituting it for an illusory one. There seems to be almost a lack of clear direction when shaping this side for the future. It took management long enough to see that their defensive woes was a major gap that had to be addressed but at the same time it is a deceptive move because it fails to consider that no matter what defenders or goalkeepers are present, there still seems to be a distinct lack of team philosophy, embodied quite frequently and alarmingly. This again, is characteristic of Bayern management, not only in the past couple of years but one can claim for the last decade as well. Since Hitzfeld’s 2001 Champions League triumph Bayern had 7 managerial appointments – apart from Real Madrid, an extremely high number for a side wishing to establish themselves as a constant threat amongst the European elite.

Ribery's exessive crossing vs. Gladbach

The most successful sides today have been characterized by distinct philosophies, whether it is Guardiola’s Barcelona, Ferguson’s United, Mourinho’s Inter and Chelsea sides, Ancelotti’s Milan, and Benitez’s Liverpool. Those sides can be considered amongst the best this past decade, having won major trophies and doing so following a distinct ideological trajectory. There is a certain amount of trust that needs to be given upon appointment of any particular manager and time to build a team. All big sides face pressures to win trophies immediately but it is always more difficult when the manager is not allowed to take full control and when there is a clear indication that the framework is flawed. This has also been absent from Bayern’s point of view. It seemed that whatever Felix Magath tried to build there was restricted by the limited control he had at the club. The same applies to perhaps the most radical departure from Bayern’s traditionalist approach, Louis van Gaal.
Ultimately it is too easy to argue that Bayern’s problem lies in stubborn management. Several publications have made similar points already. The higher ups will always clash with any given coach who attempts to demand a kind of perceived challenge to established authority. Usually the pattern has been to appoint a manager with a specific vision, only to clash, fire and then appoint a newer, more familiar, and safer choice. This occurred three times in less then ten years already. First Magath replaced by Hitzfeld, then Klinsmann by Heynckes and most recently van Gaal by Heynckes. In the most pathological of senses, this can easily be viewed and argued as a suppression of reality, tackling a problem by coming up with what seems to be a valid solution only in reality to subvert the real problem.
This is Bayern’s ideology at its purest and the component the press has overlooked the most. By hiring the friendly and familiar, strangely conservative Heynckes it is not an admission that van Gaal was the wrong choice in the sense that he failed but really an admission of the very ideology that Bayern management can only really be satisfied if there is a mouth-piece at the helm and no real risks are involved. What does this mean translate to on the pitch? Well, Klinsmann took risks by trying to play an open style that although productive in attack, it revealed their defensive frailties. The same applied to van Gaal who also wanted to radically alter the way Bayern shapes up at the very top of the formation. There is a seemingly archaic desire to play with a striker as reference point as means to ensure that no matter how poor a side plays, goals are ensured. This however obviously neglects many other problems that this very injunction spawns in the first place.
What is the solution to this? For the record, I do not fully believe this is completely a lost cause and I think Bayern can still challenge domestically and even in Europe simply because experience and individual talent goes a long way but there is a nagging sense that the true potential of this talented side has yet to be unlocked and every time there is an indication that it is being approached, regressive steps are taken. Surely Heynckes is there long enough until Bayern can find a younger coach (possible one of the up and coming domestic coaches) to start building for the future, but this again is far too familiar a move for the club – the talent is there already and it just seems to go to waste in its developmental stage. Possible answers to this dilemma? – Clearly there needs to be a better balance in communication between Rummenigge, & Co. and whoever is in the coaching position.
The first steps need to be taken by the higher ups without question as they set the precedent for whatever the coach will have or not have to work with. Unlike a Barcelona or Manchester United, Bayern will likely not allow so much control to any given individual and that is also not likely to change any time soon. Risks need to be taken too if the intention is to get anywhere near the same level as a Barcelona for instance. There is a distinct traditionalist cloud looming over Bayern in every sense of the word. Between a reluctance to hire a true modern thinker/coach, to the very notion that a modern system took so long to be accepted only to be modified to accommodate a traditional re-framing, they will find themselves in this position time and time again if these concerns are not recognized and addressed. Recognize of course is the keyword here because the problem essentially lies in the ideology that permeates the very top. To drive home how serious a matter this is, take Nerlinger’s comments regarding Mertesacker rumors: