HISTORY OF NIGERIA ARMED FORCES

THE HISTORY OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF NIGERIA
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies
by
FREDRICK C. DUMMAR, MAJ, USA
B.G.S., University of Nevada, Reno, 1989
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2002
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
ii
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE
Name of Candidate: MAJ Fredrick C. Dummar
Thesis Title: The History of the Nigerian Army and the Implications for the Future of
Nigeria
Approved by:
, Thesis Committee Chairman
LTC James L. Cobb Jr., M.A.
, Member
LTC Steven G. Meddaugh, M.A.
, Member, Consulting Faculty
LTC James C. McNaughton, Ph.D.
Accepted this 31st day of May 2002 by:
, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)
iii
ABSTRACT
THE HISTORY OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FUTURE OF NIGERIA, by MAJ Fredrick C. Dummar, 109 pages.
Ethnic and religious clashes have continued in Africa’s most densely populated nation.
Nigeria is a nation of vast human and natural resource potential that has experienced
extreme strife during forty years of transition from colonial rule to democratic
governance. The central research questions are: How has the historical development of
Nigeria’s Army effected the development of the nation-state? And how has political
engagement changed the army? The first step examined the ethnic, religious factors and
the history of military coups d’état. The second step examined the effect of military
governance on education, the economy, and foreign policy. The final step determined the
future path of Nigeria and its Army after the birth of Nigeria’s third republic. The
conclusion recommended an increase in military-to-military contact with Nigeria to
increase professionalism and respect for the subordination of the military to civilian
authority, along with increased diplomatic efforts to help Nigerians heal the wounds of
internal discord that have created the belief that military governance is the answer.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to extend special thanks you to the members of my thesis committee.
Lieutenant Colonels James Cobb, Steven Meddaugh, and James McNaughton each
contributed immensely to this project. Despite the lack of intellectual capital supplied I
provided, they struggled mightily to ensure I would finish.
I must extend another thank you to Ms. Helen Davis in the Directorate of
Graduate Degree Programs at the United States Army Command and General Staff
College. Her commitment to the MMAS program in general and to this particular
student’s attempt at formatting a document should qualify her for sainthood.
Most importantly, I must thank my wife. Susan’s support and encouragement
prompted me to pursue this topic and see it through to completion. Any remaining faults
in this paper reflect the limitations of the author.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .................................................................................... ii
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................... iv
ILLUSTRATIONS .................................................................................................... vi
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1
2. MILITARY GOVERNANCE (COUP D’ETAT
AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY) .............................................................. 17
3. EDUCATION (A MILITARY FAILURE
IN A SOCIAL PROGRAM)......................................................................... 33
4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(MILITARY FORCE TO CONTROL RESOURCES) ................................ 45
5. FOREIGN POLICY....................................................................................... 66
6. THE FUTURE OF NIGERIA AND ITS ARMY .......................................... 82
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 101
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .............................................................................. 105
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT.......................... 106
vi
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Page
1. Nigeria’s Global Position and Relative Size Compared to the United States... 2
2. Map of Nigeria .................................................................................................. 4
3. Location of Major Ethnic Groups ..................................................................... 6
4. Four Regions, 1963 ........................................................................................... 86
5. Twelve States, 1976 .......................................................................................... 87
6. Nineteen States, 1976........................................................................................ 87
7. Thirty States, 1991 ............................................................................................ 88
8. Thirty-six States, 1996 ...................................................................................... 88
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Prospects for a transition to civilian rule and democratizations are
slim. . . . The repressive apparatus of state security . . .will be
difficult for any future civilian government to control. . . .The
country is becoming increasingly ungovernable. . . . Ethnic and
regional splits are deepening. . . .[R]eligious cleavages are more
serious; Muslim fundamentalism and evangelical Christian
militancy are on the rise; and northern Muslim anxiety over
southern control of the economy is intense. . . . [T]he will to keep
Nigeria together is now very weak.1
State Department Bureau of
Intelligence and Research
Many nations in West Africa suffer from economic strife and war. United States
strategic goals for the region, like most of the world, include the assistance to fledgling
democracies, economic assistance, and military partnerships. Many nations of this region
have deep-seated problems that because of pride, arrogance, or inability they fail to deal
with. Worse yet, they often deal with the problems in a shortsighted expedient manner
that has disastrous long-term effects.
Nigeria is a major player in West Africa, and the United States must make a
concerted effort to understand the true nature of her problems (figure 1). The United
States must understand not only Nigeria's root problems, but also how Nigeria deals with
these problems internally and externally. Nigeria is a nation that suffers from tremendous
internal strife that reverberates throughout West Africa. Ethnic and religious differences,
combined with a lack of economic diversity, have created a fractured and disenfranchised
populace. A staggering national debt, estimated at $29 billion in 1999, combined with an
incomplete infrastructure and scientific base, indicates that the economy will need
2
considerable assistance to recover.2 These internal problems added to the world’s
perception that Nigeria is the most corrupt nation on the planet. Add West Africa’s
perception of Nigerian hegemony in Sub-Saharan affairs and one can begin to understand
the scope of the problem. Nigeria will be the cornerstone of U.S. regional engagement
strategy in West Africa in conjunction with some of its more stable neighbors. President
Clinton stressed Nigeria’s importance in 1999. “It is very much in America’s interest
that Nigeria succeeds, and therefore we should assist them in their success. We intend to
increase our assistance to Nigeria to expand law-enforcement and to work toward an
agreement to stimulate trade and investment between us.”3 His statement quickly found
its way into U.S. policy when the Secretary of State named Nigeria one of four “critical
democracies.”4
Figure 1. Nigeria’s Global Position and Relative Size Compared to the United
States. Source: The Library of Congress, map available at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/nigeria/ ng00_05a.pdf, 10 October 2001.
3
The development of the Nigerian Army since national independence in 1960 is of
critical concern in the development, future stability and progress of Nigeria. U.S.
national interests are involved, and the U.S. Army is at the forefront of the national
policy. Moreover, while it is easy for the casual observer to note that the Nigerian Army
is not a Western army, a more thorough analysis of Nigeria is required to understand her
army. Cultural, professional and ethnic biases are not helpful in this analysis, and are
detrimental to making real progress in Nigerian relations. This thesis will examine the
historical development of Nigeria’s army, an army inescapably linked to the development
of the nation-state. It is a history of an army created by a colonial power, which engaged
in the political governance of a nation and forever changed itself from what the western
world regards as an army. It became instead a quasi-political party with a built-in
security apparatus, a metamorphosis not lost on Nigerians. Jonathan Agwunobi lists a
few visible impacts of the politicization of the Nigerian Army:
1. Reduced its professional military aspirations
2. Induced it to perform political duties for which it was not drilled.
3. Resulted in distrust, execution, early retirement or dismissal and fear within
the military.
4. Resulted in military officers dedicating far more time, energy and imagination
to political leadership and administration than to the essential tasks relevant to military
professionals.5
Nigeria is indeed a very proud nation, with a proud army, and fine traditions, but
its institutions are very different from those in the United States. Therefore, to begin the
discussion it is necessary to give a brief introduction into the nation’s complexities. It is
4
not within the thesis scope to examine the totalities of Nigeria’s ethnicities and the
incredible diversity, but it is helpful to get a grand overview. The vast differences within
Nigeria create problems for the nation and the army that has ruled it.
Physical and Ethnic Geography
Figure 2. Map of Nigeria. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The
World Factbook, map available from http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html; Internet, 10 October 2001.
A glimpse into the vast diversity of the land and people is the first step in
understanding Nigeria. Nigeria bordered by Cameroon to the east, Chad to the northeast,
5
Niger to the north, Benin to the west, and the Atlantic Ocean to the south is the most
populous nation in West Africa (figure 2). Over 123 million people live an area of
356,669 square miles.6 At its widest, it measures about 750 miles from east to west and
about 650 miles from north to south. 7 The country's topography ranges from lowlands
along the coast and in the lower Niger Valley to high plateaus in the north and mountains
along the eastern border. Tropical forests in the south become dry savannas in the far
north. Human population densities, and erratic, uncontrolled development, pose serious
threats to the environment.
The Niger and Benue rivers form Nigeria's largest physical region. The Niger
enters the country from the northwest, the Benue from the northeast; they join at the city
of Lokoja in the south central region and continue south, where they empty into the
Atlantic at the Niger Delta (figure 3). This Y formed by the Benue and Niger provides a
geographical barrier that had a profound effect on the development of Tribal boundaries.
These tribal boundaries still influence Nigerian politics. The Hauasa-Fulani fill the top of
the Y, the Yoruba the western base, and the Igbos the eastern base.8
Nigeria's three largest ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo,
represent 68 percent of the population. Of the remaining 32 percent, about one-third
consists of groups numbering more than 1 million members each. 9 The remaining 300-
plus ethnic groups account for the final one-fifth of the population.
North of the Niger Valley are the high plains of Hausaland, a level topographic
area averaging about 2,500 feet above sea level. The Jos Plateau, located close to
Nigeria's geographic center, rises above the plains to an average elevation of 4,200 feet.
To the northeast, the plains of Hausaland fade into the basin of Lake Chad; the area is
6
lower in elevation with somewhat level terrain and sandy soils. To the northwest, the
high plains descend into the Sokoto lowland. The Hausa, concentrated in the far north
and in the Republic of Niger, are the largest of Nigeria's ethnic nations. Most Hausa are
Muslims engaged in agriculture, commerce, and small-scale industry. The Hausa have
also traditionally dominated the military. 10 Many people of non-Hausa origin, including
the city-based Fulani, have become assimilated into the Hausa nation through
intermarriage and acculturation. Other Fulani continue to depend on their livestock and
have retained their own language, Fulfulde, and cultural autonomy.11
Figure 3. Source. Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled Giant” Nigeria since Independence
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), Map.
7
Southwest of the Niger Valley (figure 3on the left side of the Y) lies the
comparatively rugged terrain of the Yoruba highlands. The delta, which lies at the base
of the Y and separates the southwestern coast from the southeastern coast, is low-lying,
swampy terrain with multiple channels through which the waters of the river empty into
the ocean. The nation’s most populous city, Lagos, is located in this western quadrant.
There is a strong sense of Yoruba identity but also a history of distrust and rivalry
dividing the various groups. The majority of Yoruba are farmers or traders who live in
large cities of that predate colonial involvement in Nigeria.12
Southeastern coastal Nigeria (figure 3 to the right of the Y) consists of low
sedimentary plains that are an extension of the southwestern coastal plains. In all, the
Atlantic coastline is a series of sandbars, and lagoons of brackish water that support the
growth of mangroves, and little else. Because of the Guinea Current, which transports
and deposits large amounts of sand, the coastline is quite straight and has few good
natural harbors. The harbors that do exist require constant dredging to remove deposited
sand.13 Farther east, along the border with Cameroon, are the eastern highlands. Vogel
Peak, which at 6,699 feet is Nigeria's highest point, is located in this region. The Igbo of
southeastern Nigeria traditionally live in small, independent villages, each with an elected
council rather than a chief. Do not let the democratic institutions completely fool you.
Igbo society is still highly stratified along lines of wealth, achievement, and social rank.
However, the Igbo people had a proud tradition of consensus building and governance
long before colonial powers set foot on the African continent. Nevertheless,
overcrowding and degraded soil have forced many Igbo to give up the agricultural
8
lifestyle and migrate to nearby cities and other parts of Nigeria disturbing their traditional
hierarchy in the process.
Other large ethnic groups in the north are the Kanuri, centered in Borno State; the
Tiv, from the Benue Valley near Makurdi; the Igala, Jukun and Ilorin-Kabba Yoruba
inhabit various portions of Northern states. In the east the Ibibio and Efik inhabit the
Calabar area, while the Ijaw wedge into other Igbo dominated areas. The Edo from the
Benin region; and the Nupe, centered in the Bida area in addition to the Urhobo and
Itsekiri inhabit western portions of Nigeria.14 These ethnic groups may be small by
Nigerian standards, but each of these lesser groups has more members than almost any of
Africa's other ethnicities. While trans-ethnic activity is on the rise, social pressures for
ethnic endogamy is still high, even within the military. Some estimates put the figure at
over 90 percent of marriages being within the ethnic groups.15 Ethnic rivalry extends to
the job market, where ethnic competition is fierce for plum government posts.
Within these complex series of ethnic groups and resource scarcity, it is easy to
see the resulting tensions. These tensions fueled the intense civil war from 1967 to 1970
when the first postcoup government announced the death of the regional governments
established in 1914 by the British. Britain had ruled Nigeria as two protectorates from
1900 to 1914, and after 1914 although united under one colonial government the three
regional governments retained authority over their respective regions.16 The change in
regional power, and the continued ascendancy of northerners in the Army ignited the first
powder keg under military rule.
Nigerians still believe that ethnic conflicts are the most destructive force
threatening survivability of the nation. 17 The federal government (army) has always
9
suppressed ethnic conflicts quickly, and the control of information has been held as a
matter of national security.
Climate, Agriculture, and Fossil Fuels
Nigeria has a tropical climate with sharp regional differences based on rainfall.
Nigerian seasons vary based on the north-south position of a mixing line of air. From the
Atlantic comes warm humid air that hits hot, dry, and often dust-laden air from the
Sahara known locally as the harmattan. Temperatures are high throughout the year,
averaging from 77 degrees to 90-plus degrees Fahrenheit. In the higher elevations of the
Jos Plateau, temperatures average 72 degrees Fahrenheit. Northern Nigeria typically
experiences greater temperature extremes than the south. Rainfall varies widely over
short distances and from year to year. Parts of the coast along the Niger Delta, where the
rainy season is year round, receive more than 160 inches of rain each year. Most of the
country's middle belt, where the rainy season starts in April or May and runs through
September or October, receives from 40 to 60 inches. The region along Nigeria's
northeastern border receives less than 20 inches of rain per year, and the rainy season
lasts barely three months.
Only in reserves protected from the chainsaw and the farmer do tropical
hardwoods, including mahogany still exist. Most forests are largely secondary growth,
primarily of species like the oil palm that the Igbos preserved for their economic value.
Forests now cover only about 12 percent of the country's total land area.18 Immediately
north of the forest is a region of tall grasses and trees. Repeated and continuous burning
of the forest created the southern margins of the Guinea savanna and grassland. The
burnings decimated important fire-sensitive plant species and contributed to erosion by
10
removing ground cover. Tropical forest is giving way to the Guinea savanna at such a
rate that the only forests expected to survive the next generation are in reserves. Beyond
the Guinea savanna lies the drier Sudan savanna, a region of shorter grasses and more
scattered, drought-resistant trees. In Nigeria's very dry northeastern corner, the semidesert
Sahel savanna persists. Throughout these drier savannas, drought and overgrazing
have led to the continuation of the desertification process.
Desertification is a major problem in Nigeria, made worse by massive water
impoundment and irrigation plans. Uncontrolled grazing and livestock migration put
tremendous pressure on the environment. Other environmental threats include poaching
and settlement within protected areas, brushfires, increasing demand for fuel wood and
timber, road expansion, and oil extraction activities. In some other parts of the country,
farmers have practiced environmental protection for centuries. Their techniques include
planting several different crops in a single field at once to cover the ground more evenly
and thereby reduce erosion and increase fertility, planting, and maintaining farmland
trees and hedgerows to reduce erosion, applying manure to farmland to maintain soil
fertility; and, in certain areas such as the Jos Plateau, terracing steep slopes. The
tremendous growth in the population and the limited development in agro-business put
increasing pressure on the subsistence farmer to increase production.
Nigeria has an organized system of nature preserves, game reserves, and national
parks in addition to a forest management system, but most management is at the state
level. Law enforcement and protected system infrastructure are lacking, and abuses of
protected land are common. The widespread hunting of wildlife for food has threatened
the animal population in Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria's few remaining elephants,
11
buffalo, lions, leopards, and other large game are in very remote areas or inside major
reserves. Smaller animals such as antelope, monkeys, jackals, and hyenas are more
widespread, but not as plentiful as one would expect given over hunting practices.
The rural economy that supports most Nigerians is based on the productivity of
the land, 33 percent of which is arable.19 Soil fertility varies considerably but is generally
poor. The most fertile of the soils are the result of alluvial deposition in river valleys.
Many, however, are overused and eroded. The landscape is becoming increasingly
barren of trees, especially in densely populated areas and near larger cities due to everincreasing
demand for trees as fuel, lumber, material for tools, fodder for animals, and
herbal medicines.
Petroleum and natural gas, the source of most of Nigeria's export earnings, are
concentrated in large amounts in the Niger Delta and just offshore. Smaller deposits are
scattered elsewhere in the coastal region. The petroleum and natural gas industries have
brought oil spills, natural gas burn offs, and clearance of vegetation away from drilling
sites, and have seriously damaged the land and waterways in the Niger Delta. Apart from
the environmental impact of oil on Nigeria, it has drastically shifted the balance of
wealth, created economic turbulence, massive corruption, and furthered the ethnic
subjugation of some tribes in the river states.
Several Nigerian groups have campaigned actively, but with little success, to
compel the government and major oil companies to introduce environmental
safeguards.20 In 1988, the government created the Federal Environmental Protection
Agency (FEPA) to address problems of desertification, oil pollution, and land
degradation. The majority of government revenue comes from government-controlled oil
12
and mineral profits and the FEPA has had only a minor impact.21 In 1995 the weak and
fragmented environmental movement was dealt a sharp blow when the government
executed Ken Saro-Wiwa, a well-known writer who struggled to stop environmental
degradation in the Niger Delta.22
Saro-Wiwa campaigned for his minority Ogoni people by manipulating
international public opinion in favor of their plight. His platform of minority rights and
environmental protection of Ogoniland were mere thorns in Nigeria’s sides until he
demanded more control of the oil by Ogonis. The control issue, and Saro-Wiwa’s high
profile and loud voice, led to a crackdown by General Sani Abacha’s government.
Ultimately, Saro-Wiwa was convicted of the trumped up charge of murdering four Ogoni
chiefs and sentenced to death. 23
The oil companies, who Saro-Wiwa charged owed millions to local villagers,
sought to distance themselves from the ugly aftermath of his death and to spin themselves
as the victims of the situation in the Delta. Saro-Wiwa had charged that Shell, TotalFina
Elf, Texaco, Chevron, Mobil, and Eni cooperated with successive military governments,
which took billions of dollars in oil revenues while doing nothing to develop the region
of the exploited Niger Delta.24 Recently Shell put $150 million into local development in
an attempt to clean its Nigerian reputation and build a measure of rapport with the local
tribes.25 The tactics of kidnapping oil workers, smashing oil installations, and cutting
production by sabotage were routinely reported in the international media. Lost in the
din was the voice of the farmer whose air and water were polluted with oil and smoke.26
The poorest Nigerians in the delta are angry. They want to be included in the economic
13
prosperity of the nation, and they will result to violence in order to receive their fair
share.
In a one-sided economy earning an estimated $14 billion from oil in 2001, control
of the oil is more important than economic diversification to most Nigerians. As early as
1990, oil accounted for 90 percent of the country’s foreign exchange receipts, oil exports
being 97 percent of all exports.27 Chapter 4 will further discuss the linkage of oil, the
economic elite that control it, and the corruption it has caused in the senior ranks of the
army.
Agriculture versus Industrialization
The above facts all point to the incredible cultural diversity and conflict within
Nigeria’s agricultural economy that is locked in what Alvin Toffler has called the first
wave.28 It is characterized by land being the basis for economy, life, family structure,
culture, and politics. The strict authoritarian nature of government in this phase keeps
most people locked into a caste system while only a few benefit. The socioeconomic
elite need control of the oil, and will use any methods available to retain control.
Unfortunately for Nigeria, she never enjoyed a victory of Second Wave industrialism
over agriculture as occurred during the U.S. civil war when a mostly industrial North
defeated a mostly agricultural South and set the stage for further industrialization of
North America.29 Nigeria’s ethnic clashes, symptomatic of people attempting to include
themselves in the economic prosperity of a preindustrialized nation, always led to stricter
control by the army. They did not lead to a massive social upheaval that could have
propelled them into the industrial age. The societal changes of the world passed Nigeria
14
by, not because her people were backward or unwilling to change, but because those in
power were clinging to a past that supported their agenda.
In his book, The Military Franchise, Akin Akindele makes the assertion that his
fellow Nigerians were “slaphappy” from years of suffering “abject poverty in the midst
of selective opulence.”30 In addition, he asserts that most now believe that “political
thievery is a legitimate activity.”31 After watching the patterns of fledgling democracy
interspersed with coups, he gave the following description of the 1983 election season:
An educated electorate awaited arrogant office seekers at the port of
reelection in 1983. . . . More citizens began to demand to know more about the
people behind the carefully crafted personalities. . . . This increasing awareness
was going to interfere with the prearranged 1983 elections “moonslide” victory.
We were to be well on our way to a one party state. Some of the less tolerant
population took exception. The corrupt leadership stood its ground. As always, it
was going to impose its will on the people. The affray that ensued in the
politically conscious western section of the country was almost inevitable. It was
an overdue war that had to be fought. There was a decision to subjugate the
national will. . . .
Economic and social violence had been visited on a naïve people. Its will
subjugated. Its desires ignored. In time, out of frustration rather than hate,
citizens rose almost in unison against the growing anarchy. They were going to
wash the ledger clean with the blue blood of their tormentors. It was going to be a
free for all. . . . The entire nation could smell the sweet scent of change. It waited
nervously for the final catalyst. “God, don’t let it be another palliative palace
coup”, was the generally expressed sentiment about a military coup everyone
knew was destined to happen. . . .
The collective fantasy was aborted by a self-serving preemptive coup.
The wind was effectively taken out of the revolutionary sail of the nation. The
ruling class had just tendered its last card. The joke was on us. They had merely
acted pragmatically, tactically conceding defeat in order to preserve their position.
He who fights and runs way, lives to fight in another political dawn. In the
excitement of the moment, the ingenious ploy for time by the ousted politicians
was lost on the gleeful population. 32
This linkage of the army to a tumultuous political process in a nation of multiple
ethnicities and resource scarcity creates numerous problems for the Nigerian soldier. The
army is some, or all, of the following in the eyes of the average Nigerian: a tool for
15
internal population control, a self-serving “watch dog” of the political process, a group of
on-call lackeys for the socioeconomic elite, a vehicle for upward social mobility for the
officer corps, and a legitimate tool for certain ethnic groups to subjugate other groups.
None of these mission profiles leads to a professional force capable of acting in the best
interests of the nation state. In the following chapters, I will explore the legacy of
military rule on Nigeria and the changes in the institution itself as the result of its role in
governance.
1Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold
War (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 14.
2Theodros Dagne, Nigeria in Political Transition (Washington, D.C. : Library of
Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2001), 5.
3Ibid., 12.
4Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001;
available from http://www.state.gov/www/budget/fy2001/fn150/forops_full/150fy01_
fo_ africa.html; Internet; accessed on 22 February 2002.
5Jonathan C. Agwunobu, The Nigerian Military in a Democratic Society (Kaduna:
Olabola Graphic Press, 1992), 90.
6Dagne, 3.
7Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html; Internet; accessed on 10
October 2001.
8Rotimi T. Suberu, Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria (Ibadan:
Spectrum Books Limited, 1996), 12.
9Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, available from http://www.
odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html; Internet; accessed on 17 August 2001.
10Theodros Dagne, Nigeria in Political Transition (Washington D.C. : The
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2001), 4.
11Suberu, 48.
16
12Ellen Thorp, Ladder of Bones: The Birth of Modern Nigeria from 1853 to
Independence (London: Jonathan Cape Limited, 1956), 218.
13Ibid., 83.
14Suberu, 17.
15The Library of Congress Web, Nigeria: a country study, available from
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html; Internet; accessed on 26 November 2001.
16Ibid.
17Ibid.
18Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, available from
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html; Internet; accessed on 17
August 2001.
19Ibid.
20Suberu, 32.
21Ibid., 30.
22Ibid., 80.
23“Delta Rights,” Economist 358, no. 8205 (20 January 2001): 42.
24Ibid.
25“Helping, but Not Developing: A Report on Projects Supposed to Help Local
People.” Economist 359, no. 8221 (12 May 2001): 52.
26“Boiling Oil,” Economist 359, no. 8217 (14 April 2001): 44.
27Sarah Ahmad Khan, Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 183.
28Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: Bantam Books, 1980), 13.
29Ibid., 23.
30Akin O. Akindele, The Military Franchise (Chapel Hill: Professional Press,
1993), 68.
31Ibid., 68.
32Ibid., 65.
17
CHAPTER 2
MILITARY GOVERNANCE
(COUPS D’ETAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY)
In the absence of autonomizing mechanisms in the post-colonial
state, the resources of physical coercion become the tools of
particular groups, especially the hegemonic factions of the ruling
class. . . . So we have essentially relations of raw power in which
right tends to be coextensive with power and security depends on
the control of power. The struggle for power, then, is everything
and is pursued by every means.1
C. Ake
The Nigerians inherited a complex bureaucracy from the British colonialists in
1960, along with national borders that fostered rather than subdued internal tension.
Before the fledgling democracy could gain control of the situation, it accepted assistance
from the only organization believed to be capable of governing in Nigeria. How could
these patriotic officers sit idly by and watch politicians vie for control and ethnic
domination while tearing their nation apart? The army could have been a savior, but its
involvement in politics changed the institution and the ethnic undertones and political
aspirations of the officers turned the army into the tormentor of the nation.
This condensed coup history demonstrates the important shaping factor played by
military coups, not only on the Nigerian Army’s structure and capabilities but also the
country’s psyche. The omnipresent threat of military coups has hung like a cloud of
paranoia in the halls of government and the army. While coups d'état are certainly not a
phenomena known only to Nigerians, coups have come to be seen as routine events in the
lifespan of the average Nigeria citizen. They have decimated the ranks of their military,
with Nigeria losing many of her brilliant officers to coups and countercoups.2 The losses
18
came in many forms, from casualties during the initial fighting, execution by firing
squad, imprisonment, or the less severe mandatory retirement.
The lists of officers involved in coups d'état, killed or jailed in the aftermath of
military tribunals is interesting reading. It is informative to trace the involvement of
some of Nigeria’s current political leaders and their adversaries. A list compiled from
Richard Akinnola’s book of coup d'état in Nigeria is included in appendix 1.3
An examination of the list may lead you to a keen insight into the Nigerian Army.
The successful coups have contained the same core of officers (1966 counter coup / 1975
/ 1983 / 1985). The unsuccessful and aborted coups did not include the key power
brokers among the armed forces. They were launched by individuals attempting to break
the northern stranglehold on the country, and they failed to unseat the existing military
government (1976 / 1986 / 1990). The major significance of those involved in successful
coups becomes evident when they are shown within the northern clique that actually
wields power in the army, and those that served without a real opportunity to influence
the situation.
Preindependence
Nigeria’s armed forces can trace their lineage to three colonial military units. The
first Nigerian military unit, Glover’s Hausas, was established in 1862 by Captain John
Glover to defend Lagos. The demographic recruitment of northerners perpetuated the use
of Hausa as the command language of the Nigerian army until the 1950s. This is the
historic origin of the ethnic imbalance of the Nigerian Army to this day. 4 In addition to
Glover’s Hausas, the Royal Niger Company Constabulary was raised in 1888 to protect
British interests in Northern Nigeria. Where Glover’s Hausas were recruited from the
19
north to protect the south, the Company Constabulary was recruited to serve an internal
security role in Northern Nigeria. This constabulary formed the core of the Northern
Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF).5 The third unit, the Oil
Rivers Irregulars, was created predominantly of Igbo’s in 1891. This unit was later
designated the Niger Coast Constabulary, and formed the Southern Regiment of the
WAFF.6 The two regiments became the Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF on January 1,
1914 along with the consolidation of the Nigerian Protectorates.7
In 1928 the WAFF was renamed the Royal West African Frontier Force
(RWAFF) and during the 1930s expanded from four battalions to six battalions which
served in two theaters. The Northern and Southern commands had major installations at
Sokoto, Kano, Zaira, Kadubna, Maiduguri, Yola, Enugu and Calabar.8 In World War II,
the Nigerian Army expanded to 28 battalions that served outside Nigeria as part of the
Allied war effort. In the 1950s, following World War II, the RWAFF resumed its
primary mission of internal security, police actions, and punitive expeditions to break
strikes, control local disturbances, and enforcing tax collection. The World War II
experience led to expansion to a two-brigade system with associated Combat Support and
Combat Service Support units.9 The first officer of Nigerian heritage was appointed in
1948. The Africanization of the officer corps continued through the 1950s until
independence. In 1956, the Nigeria Regiment was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces,
and in 1958 the colonial government assumed control.10 In 1960, when Nigeria gained
her independence, there were 82 Nigerian officers, mostly Igbo, while the soldiers were
still predominantly Hausas.11
20
Post-Independence (Ethnic Politics)
On 1 October 1960, Britain granted Nigeria her independence. The first prime
minister was Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a northern Fulani. 12 The political
landscape was dominated at the time of the 1959 elections by three major ethnic based
parties, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (Igbo), the Northern People’s
Conference (NPC), and the Action Group (AG).13 The elections resulted in a northern
power base that despite its overwhelming size compared to the other ethnic groups was
unable to capture the seats required to form the government alone.14 The NPC was given
the dominant role in government because it still had more seats than the rival parties did,
and some feared that the northern leaders would not agree to independence if they were
not in control of the federal government.15 The Hausa-Fulani dominated NPC entered
into a strained and tenuous relationship with the Igbo dominated NCNC, which allowed it
to form the government as a coalition, and had the additional effect that Dr. Namdi
Azikiwe (Igbo) became the governor general and later president of Nigeria.16
As the 1964 elections approached, the NPC was no longer content to share power
with the NCNC. Their plan included breaking off relations with the NCNC and
fracturing the Yoruba AG party so a Yoruba-Igbo alliance would not ruin the plan. 17 The
NCNC boycotted the election and President Azikiwe would not call on the victorious
NPC and its leader Balewa to form the government.18 The immediate crisis was resolved
but Azikiwe’s power base eroded. Following the failed 1964 elections, a large portion of
the population believed the government to be corrupt, or at least unacceptably dominated
by the North.
21
The fallout from the splintering of the Yoruba’s by the NPC was also causing
unrest. The New Nigerian Democratic Party (NNDP), a Yoruba party that had formed an
alliance with the north, claimed victory in the 1965 elections for the Western House of
Assembly.19 AG on NNDP violence erupted, resulting in Lagos being dubbed the “Wild,
Wild West,” but Balewa refused to step in and stop the violence.20 This decision would
ultimately cost him and other northern leaders their lives in Nigeria’s first d'état coup.
This was the first in a series of coups that have plagued Nigeria for three decades.
Military Government
The core planners of the first coups were Igbo officers, and in 1965, Igbos
commanded three out of five battalions.21 Just prior to Nigeria’s first coup on January
15, 1966, a fourth battalion came under Igbo control when its Yoruba commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, was ordered to Abeokuta (a city in western Nigeria)
for a military course.22 The main centers of action in the January 1966 coup were the
northern towns of Kaduna and Kano with minor actions in the south around Ibadan and
Lagos. Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, the coups main protagonist, claimed to have purity of
purpose, as he wanted to stop the cycle of ethnic violence and corruption in the country. 23
His Igbo heritage and the ongoing political crisis that had led up to this point made his
motivations suspect. The northern officers felt that this action was primarily an effort to
purge them from the ranks, and allow the Igbos to run Nigeria. General Johnson Thomas
Umunakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi (Igbo), who ultimately came to power in the coup, refuted
these allegations with a story of his own. His version of events was broadcast across
Nigeria in the wake of the military takeover:
22
The military government of the republic of Nigeria wishes to state that it
has taken over the interim administration of the republic of Nigeria following the
invitation of the council of ministers of the last government for the army to do so.
. . .
In the early hours of the morning of January 1966, officers kidnapped the
Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance and took them to an unknown
destination. The revolt was widespread throughout the country and some highranking
officers were killed. . . .
The vast majority of the Nigerian Army remain[ed] completely loyal to
the national government and immediately took steps to control the situation. 24
General Ironsi (Igbo) had been in a position to negotiate with the government to
step in, and get the army under control. The northern political leaders, including the
Prime Minister Balewa, had been killed in the coup and President Azikiwe (Igbo) was
conveniently out of the country. Another senior Igbo officer, Lieutenant Colonel Emeka
Odumegwu Ojukwu, was in northern Nigeria at Kano during the coup and refuted the
northern allegation that the coup was an eastern plot to control the government. Ojukwu
(Igbo), who became the military governor of eastern Nigeria after the coup, completely
denied the allegation that the Igbos were attempting to purge the army of northern
officers. In his book, Biafra: Random Thoughts of Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, General of
the People’s Army, he states that he was not aware of the coup until after it had begun,
and he only stepped in to get control of the situation and get Nzeogwu (Igbo) back in
line.25 It is held as truth by some Nigerians that General Ironsi (Igbo) merely capitalized
on the timing of a disjointed coup to come to power, and that a wide spread anti-northern
sentiment was not present in the army. The northerners who suffered the most in putsch
were not going to sit idly by and watch the easterners take over Nigeria. Racial tension in
Nigeria was about to reach an all time high. The major reaction by the northern officers
occurred in July 1966, less than seven months from Nigeria’s first coup, when a group of
23
eastern officer met in western Nigeria. Gen Ironsi (Igbo), also in western Nigeria at the
time, was captured by Major T. Y. Danjuma (Jukun from the middle belt). General Ironsi
(Igbo) the supreme commander and his host Lieutenant Colonel Fajuyi (Yoruba), the
western region military governor, were executed after Major Danjuma pronounced the
following sentence:
[General Ironsi] you are under arrest. You organized the killing of our brother
officers in January and you have done nothing to bring the so-called dissident
elements to justice because you were part and parcel of the whole thing. . . .
I ran around risking my neck trying to calm the ranks, and in February,
you told us they would be tried. This is July and nothing has been done. You will
answer for your actions.26
With the death of General Ironsi (Igbo) and his western state governor, the
northern officers were now in control of two thirds of Nigeria. Lieutenant Colonel
Gowon (middle belt), a young thirty-two-year-old middle belt Christian with a northern
power base, assumed control of the country. Gowon was the most senior officer the
north had at the time, and his rise to power marked a new height for northern hegemony
over both the army and the government.27 The Eastern Governor, Lieutenant Colonel
Ojukwu (Igbo), was cut off from the government as Gowon created new states and
allowed the slaughter of Igbos to continue in northern Nigeria. It was this set of
circumstances that led to the creation of Biafra in 1967 and civil war.28
General Gowon would rule Nigeria for ten years. Through civil war and massive
corruption he held his post. In 1975, while visiting Uganda, his brother-in-law Joe Garba
ousted him. Nigeria was awash in corruption, and many felt that Gowon’s comments
alluding to a postponement of the planned 1976 elections were the final blow. Others
backed the coup as they felt the federal government was still punishing the Igbos in the
24
aftermath of the civil war and felt that a policy of reintegration was necessary. Whatever
the reasons, the officers that spearheaded the coup had decided on a ruling triumvirate
before the action. After the coup, Colonel Muhammed Wushishi was dispatched by
plane to gather up the officers selected by the plotters.29 Murtala Muhammed (Hausa),
Olusegun Obasanjo (Yoruba), and T. Y. Danjuma (Jukun from the middle belt) were
brought in and informed of their new jobs, as Head of State, Chief of Staff Supreme
Headquarters, and Chief of Army Staff respectively. Obasanjo, a non-northerner, was
sandwiched into the ruling trio in an obvious move to maintain the allegiance of the more
moderate southwestern Nigerians.
The next tremor in government would come six months after Mohammed
reluctantly accepted his position as the head of state under conditions established by
Garba and his fellow coup plotters. His reluctance was well founded, as his predecessor
Gowon was still alive with plenty of support remaining within the ranks of the army. The
Gowon supporters plotted to assassinate the top three to settle the score, and reestablish
the Gowon government.30 The officers sent to kill Muhammed were successful, but the
coup ultimately failed, and General Obasanjo ascended to power as the general that sat as
Muhammed’s second in command. Obasanjo (Yoruba) attempted to pass the post to
Danjuma (middle belt), but Danjuma declined.31 Obasanjo would lay the groundwork to
hand over power to an elected government.
This oddity among coups had originally named General Murtala Mohammed,
General Olusegun Obasanjo and General Theophilus Danjuma to the top three positions
in the military government. At last Nigeria had seen a viable use of the army to stabilize
a volatile situation while allowing a transition to a democratic government. Even after
25
the death of Muhammed in the 1976 coup, Obasanjo and Danjuma transitioned the
government to democracy and faded from the coup scene. However, Ibrahim Babangida
and Sani Abacha had learned different lessons while they were coming up through the
ranks of the Nigerian Army and they were biding their time until another opportunity
presented itself.
After four major coups, the Nigerians would get another chance at democracy.
Thirteen years of military rule (1966-1979) ended when the second republic was
introduced on 1 October 1979. Alhajo Shelu Shagari, a candidate of the National Party
of Nigeria (NPN), won the presidency by a slim margin. The NPN was essentially a
retagging of the old NPC. It was still dominated by Hausa-Fulani interests, and had
many of the old NPC members pushing for Sharia law in Nigeria.32 The slim victory led
to speculation that the departing military regime had favored the party and of course the
criticism that the NPN backed the powerful northerner’s agricultural agenda.33 The life
of the second republic would be short. The combination of corruption within the Alhajo
Shehu Shagari government, the attempted coup by middle belt officers in 1981, and the
wide spread accusations of ballot stuffing in the 1983 election led to another successful
northern officer coup in 1983. The election had become a zero-sum gain and some of the
losers, as always, would be advocates for military intervention. 34 This seems odd in light
of a prominent member of the NPN party stating before the 1983 election that there were
only two political parties in Nigeria: “the NPN and the military.”35
General Buhari (Hausa) explained the purpose of this coup, “The army came to
power this time around, with the primary objective of saving our great nation from total
26
collapse.”36 Buhari (Hausa) identified the contributing factors to the total collapse of
Nigeria:
1) A grave and economic predicament and uncertainty, which the inept
and corrupt civilian leadership had imposed on the nation for the past four years.
2) Brazen acts of indiscipline in all its ramifications were the order of the
day. Misappropriations of public funds amounting to billions of Naira from the
nation’s treasury went unchallenged.
3) Oil merchants and agents emerged overnight owing their massive
wealth to illegal oil deals.
4) Contracts were over inflated in order to raise the amount of kickbacks
for unscrupulous officials.
5) Staggering millions of Naira were paid out in mobilization fees to
contractors both local and foreign who obtained their mobilization fees and just
disappeared. Many did not even know the site of the project for which
mobilization fees had been collected.37
Whatever the government arrangement in 1983 and correct as these assertions
may be, the army’s cloak of nobility was wearing thin with most Nigerians. Everyone
knew there was money to be made in oil and banking in Nigeria if the nation’s population
could be kept under control. The average Nigerian was not going to benefit from the
situation prior to the 1983 elections, nor was he going to benefit from the strict measures
of the Buhari regime in the short term. The fact that Buhari was a Muslim from the north
who attempted to implement Sharia law at the federal level convinced most of his
countrymen that this was another northern regime, and a more stern one that.38
Buhari’s regime that brought the end of the second republic would find its end in
another round of military in fighting. General Babangida (Hausa) would benefit from
major coup number six to become the next head of state. To highlight the volatile and
incestuous nature of army politics in Nigeria, General Sani Abacha (Hausa) would serve
as Babangida’s spokesperson to the press for postcoup propaganda as he had for Buhari.
The military-on-military violence was personality based, and not motivated by the quality
27
of governance by Buhari, as bad as it may have been judged. Buhari had been a strict
Muslim that believed that recovery of the economy and stern discipline were the answers
to Nigeria’s problems, however draconian the means needed to be. His main problems
were that he was a strict Muslim and he was a strict military man; both of these
characteristics made him too strict for his country and his army. He lost his political
control of his own party, the army. The significance of the following political
ascendancy through infighting is enormous. It demonstrates the development of the
Nigerian military mind. It strengthens the assertions of Agwunobi from chapter 1 that
speak to the erosion in professionalism and the loss of military focus. Not only were
Nigerian officers being raised on political duties rather than tactical duties their ultimate
goal was political power and greed, not strategic operations and selfless service. Officers
that operated along the traditional military ethos were no longer welcome in the halls of
power. Babangida and Abacha who had been raised on coups throughout their careers
knew that professional officers were still in the army, but they had personally learned
their lessons in the political arena. Neither was about to back away before their shot at
the Nigerian bankroll.
Two aborted coups during the Babangida regime require mention as the suspected
plotters came from outside the northern clique, and they demonstrate the dynamics at
work in the Nigerian military. These coups, though ineffective in removing the standing
government, showed the growing rift in the army. This fault line had both ethnic and
professional undertones. Motivations are a hard thing to judge, but it appears that not all
of the plots to bring Babangida down were motivated by individuals desiring to exploit
the nation. The 1985 coup against Babangida, had at is corps a group of intellectuals
28
funded by the poet General Mamman Vasta.39 While it never got off the ground, the
intentions of the accused resulted in the death of Vasta and a number of his
coconspirators. A group of southern and middle belt Nigerians launched the next coup in
1990, called the nation’s bloodiest, in an attempt to remove the northern officers and the
middle belt that had aligned with the north. It can be inferred that both coups had
targeted the life-long president General Babangida. The following excerpt from Major
Orkari’s 1990 coup broadcast illuminate the rift between those in power in the army, and
the rest of the army.
We wish to emphasize that this was not just another coup, but a well conceived
planned and executed revolution of the marginalized and enslaved people of the
middle belt and the south with a view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn
from eternal slavery and colonization by a clique of this country. 40
Major Orkar continued on to point out that General Babangida (Hausa) had pitted
groups against each other to destroy his opponents, as in the 1986 coup conspiracy
execution of General Vasta. He charged that Babangida had bought off and terrorized the
media, purged intellectual capital in the university system, and campaigned to destroy the
military by withholding funds.41 Major Orkar also noted that a few northern ethnic
groups had benefited disproportionately from Nigeria’s riches while the southerners and
middle belters continued to struggle.42 Orkar’s final point in his platform was the need to
plan for a handover to democratic government.43 Certainly, Orkar’s comments
demonstrate that a core of professional officers were still interested in Army business,
while Babangida clearly was not. Babangida had ridden the army to the top, and without
the fear of an external threat to Nigeria he no longer needed their services as a
professional army.
29
History will record that these counter coups would set the pattern for the
remainder of Babangida and Abacha’s regimes. This duo would continue to announce
the uncovering of coup plots, with resulting executions and forced retirements, and the
corresponding need to maintain them in power. Their need to rid themselves of political
opponents and officers that favored transition of government to democracy gutted the
Nigerian Army.44 Even the interim government of Chief Ernest Shonekan which bridged
the gap between Bangida and Abacha is seen by many to have been a ruse to transfer
power to another general and keep federal power out of southern hands without the
resulting public outcry. 45
Interesting to note from these phantom coups is the jailing of General Olusegun
Obasanjo along with forty other officers and journalists for hinting that Abacha should
hand over power.46 It could be argued that this act, more than any other, launched the
now legitimate political career of Nigeria’s elected president Obasanjo. This act
separated him from the army ruling class in the mind of some Nigerians. Obasanjo still
benefited from his moderate stance in Nigeria. He was a Yoruba who had served among
the Hausas in a military government and yet had handed over power and argued that the
army should stay out of government.
The past motivations of the army’s officer corps hang over the first president of
the third republic. In order to have a measure of lasting success the democracy must find
a legitimate base in Nigeria. What sort of base has been established by thirty years of
mostly military rule? Chapters 3, 4, and 5 will address the army’s past success and
failures in developing education, economic, and diplomatic programs to foster democracy
30
while acting as a governing body and what legacy this leaves as Nigeria travels the
current road to democracy.
1Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1998), 23.
2Richard Akinnola, Fellow Countrymen…: The Story of Coup D’etats in Nigeria
(Ikeja: Rich Consult, 2000), v.
3Ibid., 2.
4The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available from
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, November 26, 2001.
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11Ibid.
12Tom Mbeke-Ekanem, Beyond Execution: Understanding the Ethnic and
Military Politics in Nigeria (Lincoln: Writer’s Showcase, 2000), 4.
13Ibid., 5.
14Osaghae, 32.
15Ibid., 33.
16Ibid., 32.
17Ibid., 42.
18Ibid., 38.
19Mbeke-Ekanem, 6.
20Ibid., 7.
31
21Akinnola, 34.
22Ibid., 35.
23Mbeke-Ekanem, 8.
24 Akinnola, 17.
25Ibid., 23.
26Ibid., 32.
27Mbeke-Ekanem, 10.
28Ibid., 11.
29Joe Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering (Ibadan: Spectrum books Limited, 1991), xvii.
30Jonathan C. Agwunobi, The Nigerian Military in a Democratic Society
(Kaduna: Olabola Graphics, 1992), 6.
31Akinnola, 16.
32 Osaghae, 120.
33Ibid., 128.
34Ibid., 153.
35Ibid., 111.
36Agwunobi, 3.
37Ibid.
38Osaghae, 168.
39Akinnola, 81.
40Ibid., 97.
41Ibid., 98.
42Ibid., 99.
43Ibid., 101.
44Ibid., 116.
32
45Ibid., 108.
46Ibid., 11.
33
CHAPTER 3
EDUCATION (A MILITARY FAILURE IN A SOCIAL PROGRAM)
There is a complete split between power and moral right, and
unless you have access to the power, you have nothing. Everyone
is seeking instant gratification. No one is prepared to think of the
future. . . . Nigeria is the land of no tomorrow. 1
Bobo Brown
As democracies have taken hold across the globe in the last century, certain trends
have emerged in these governments regardless of nation. Among the trends or indicators
is the requirement for an educated population. This critical component has been called a
fundamental indicator for democratic governance.2 Although no direct correlation
between quality of education and the quality of the government has been established, the
linkage has been identified. The fact that effective civic education is indispensable to the
establishment and maintenance of a democracy and its required institutions is
undeniable.3 The military governments of Nigeria have ignored this fact, and successive
regimes have retained a self-serving approach intent on not building the base of support
for democratic governance. Money that could have been spent on education was
funneled into private accounts of military officers and political leaders.
Some of Nigeria’s best and brightest manage to slip out of the country in search
of educational opportunities, but most Nigerians are victims, trapped in a world they are
undereducated to cope with, and with few prospects for employment. The situation has
taught the average citizen that he has two means of escape from a nation of
malnourishment and random violence. They can join the army or leave the country. A
population in excess of 60 million people under the age of 18 is victimized by a lack of
34
opportunity. 4 To understand how the nation got where they are, one must understand the
history and the motivations of those in power.
Precolonial and Colonial Education
Prior to the coming of the Europeans, Nigerian people had their own educational
systems based on tribal beliefs. Young Nigerians were taught by their elders to conform
to social customs and traditions of the community in order to be good citizens and to
learn a trade or vocation required in the agricultural economy. This communal education
was aimed at maintaining continuity in the vocations required by the tribe and in the
continuity of culture by transmitting to successive generations not only accumulated
knowledge but also the acquired standards of values.5 This is in keeping with the
requirements for first wave educations. As Toffler suggests, Nigerians would need “mass
education” to participate in an industrialized second wave, but for the time being their
education system fit their subsistence agricultural lifestyles.6 With the growth of British
commercial and colonial interests in the nineteenth century, British missionaries
established schools for formal education of Nigerians.7 This system would later place the
emphasis on the individual states within Nigeria to maintain the various British schools
established within their borders. As after independence, the federal government had no
constitutional responsibility for education in the states.8 The resulting system handed to
the first Nigerian republic had differing policies and procedures and no established
standards for education.
35
Postindependence education
A formal education policy took effect during the second republic in September
1982. The 6-3-3-4 system, as it was dubbed, was to provide six years of primary
education, a secondary 2-tier (3-year junior and 3-year senior) education of core
curriculum subjects, followed by four years at the university level. As in most systems,
the technically minded or vocationally inclined would be advised to follow courses in
those fields.9
The democratically elected government of Shuhari had taken the first step toward
building an informed democratic citizenry. Formulation of a national policy on education
was now the sole responsibility of the federal government. State governments were
however still responsible for specific needs in accordance with the national policy. 10 The
6-3-3-4 policy was never fully resourced before the coup of General Buhari. The
subsequent military regimes of Babangida and Abacha would reverse this policy, and
throw the educational system into a state of chaos that has only recently begun to lift.
In Nigeria today the government is struggling to gain control of the situation and
to educate their young people not only for their role in a democratic nation but also for
the requirements of the information age. The government’s education philosophy as
spelled out by the external publicity department:
The Nigerian education philosophy is based on the development of the
individual into a sound and useful citizen and the provision of equal education
opportunities for all citizens at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, both
inside and outside the formal school systems. The content and quality of
instruction at all levels is oriented towards inculcating respect for the worth and
dignity of the individual; faith in man's ability to make rational decisions; moral
and spiritual values in interpersonal and human relations, shared responsibility for
the common good of society; respect for the dignity of labor and promotion of the
emotional, physical and psychological health of all children and the acquisition of
appropriate skills, abilities and competence.11
36
A bold vision statement for the future, but the legacy of Generals Buhari,
Babangida, and Abacha will take a tremendous amount of resources not currently
programmed by Nigeria for education expenditures. Current numbers are high for school
age children receiving primary education at 89 percent, but the numbers quickly drop to
30 percent for secondary education and to a pitiful 4 percent in postsecondary
education. 12
Educational Assessment
A Nigerian newspaper ran a story in 2000 that pointed to the beginning of the
next revolution in education, and the sad state of the current system. Chuks Akunna
reported on the World Banks belated apology in 2000 for the failure of its past
educational projects in Nigeria and their pledge to improve and assist Nigeria in
reforming its education system. The bank put the blame on the Federal Ministry of
Education and their associates at the bank for the failure of plans implemented between
1988 and 1990. The development, the bank disclosed, taught it some lessons, assuring
that “some fundamental changes have taken place, in the way we operate.”13
The bank had been accused of dumping obsolete equipment in Nigeria and
charging incredible interest rates.14 The World Bank countered that the military
government in power at the time had not consulted the educators and had shrouded the
agreements in secrecy. 15 The World Bank had been duped by General Babangida
(Hausa) but corruption would not ruin its future dealing with a democratically elected
government. In an effort to improve the effectiveness of their programs, under the
Obasanjo government, the bank launched an assessment program in 1999. The objectives
of the consultations were to:
37
1. Assess expectations and levels of satisfaction with primary education on the
part of service users and providers (parents, teachers, educational administrators, etc.).
2. Investigate perceived constraints to the improvement of service provision and
assess suggestions of the various stakeholders for improving services, together with the
potential and willingness to realize them.
3. Identify and describe existing innovative approaches to improve performance
in the delivery of social services through community participation, targeting, client
involvement, fiscal decentralization or other mechanisms.
4. Develop recommendations for the development of pilot initiatives to test or
replicate these approaches to be implemented within the framework of the on-going
Primary Education Project.16
The World Bank toured fifty-four primary schools and communities across
Nigeria. This time the World Bank went straight to those effected by the educational
woes in Nigeria, they interviewed parents, pupils, teachers and head teachers, community
leaders, parent-teacher association (PTA) members and officers, educational
administrators, and supervisors.17
The consultants found the school environment to be far from conducive to
learning, and deficient in pupil safety, security, and health. 18 Classroom space was
inadequate and in a poor state of repair. There was no funding to meet maintenance costs
or to obtain supplies of instructional materials. Schools lacked offices, desks and other
furniture, and recreational facilities and had few or no toilet facilities. The inadequate
supply of materials and textbooks limited both teacher effectiveness and student
learning. 19
38
The assessment team also found that while most teachers and head teachers were
committed to their vocation, low pay, poor working conditions, and inadequate facilities
had eroded motivation and satisfaction. 20 This lack of satisfaction over conditions led to
nation wide teachers strike in 1999. About 250,000 of Nigeria’s teachers demanded
payment of the new minimum wage of 3,000 naira per month, which raised their pay
from 1,000 naira.21 (One US dollar is roughly equal to 100 naira) The pay raise would be
the equivalent of US$20.00. The teachers also demanded the establishment of structures
for the implementation of a National Commission for Secondary Education and National
Teachers Registration Council as well as the creation of a pension system for teachers.22
The pay problem stemmed from a 1992 decision by the military government of General
Babangida (Hausa) to transfer payment of the teachers back to the local governments.
The local councils had no money to pay the teachers.23 This pay decision coupled with
the wholesale movement and removal of teachers within Nigeria are more indicators of
Babangida’s antieducation policy.
Babangida, like the generals that had passed before him, could benefit more from
the continued instability in Nigeria. His bank account was growing daily, and a fine
retirement could be had as an elder statetsman who talked out of both sides of his mouth.
An educated population would have jeopardized his presence at the public trough. He
made the obligatory prodemocracy statements to the international media, such as:
It is not enough to just believe in democracy. You must also learn it and
understand how to make it work. So we have put the learning process in motion. .
. . People are now learning what democracy is all about.24
39
The words amounted to little more than a thinly disguised deception campaign as
the millionaire general continued to benefit from the corrupt policies of his regime into
his retirement.
Military Education
The military education system for the Nigerian officer corps is based around three
key institutions. These institutions cover the range from initial training to mid level
professional education, to senior level development. The entry-level institution was
created during the first republic in 1964. The Nigerian Defence Academy, now known as
the Nigerian Military University, trains new officers for service in the army with a thirtymonth
curriculum.25 The keystone institution for military learning was formed under the
military regime of General Obasanjo (Yoruba). The Command and Staff College, created
in 1976 featured a five-month course for senior officers, presumably based on Obasanjo’s
and other officers’ observations of the officer corps’ failures in the nation’s civil war.26
An eleven-month course for field grade officers was added in 1977, and a ten-week
course for lieutenants and captains was added in 1978.27 The progressive minded
Obasanjo was truly looking to the future, a future that included a professional officer
corps that understood civilian control of the military and the militaries role in a nation
like Nigeria. The curriculum expanded to increase attention on internal security and aid
to civil authority. 28 The officer education system eventually expanded to include a senior
service college named the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.
The military was neglecting the basic education of their citizens, and the
government was failing by example to educate the officer corps and soldiers that served
Nigeria. The military governments never adopted significant education reforms for the
40
civilian sector. And as discussed in chapter 2 most officers understood that the true
nature of service in the military was increasingly less about military topics. Retired
military members were not used as teachers, as advocated by many prominent Nigerians.
Instead they were educated in a traditional western military fashion. 29 This did nothing to
prepare soldiers for useful postmilitary careers, nor did it prepare them for the civil
government role they were filling. Military assistance to government is one topic,
military government is quite another. Instead of building an army of educated soldiers
prepared to reenter civilian society as engineers, educators, lawyers, and scientists. They
continued to dump new generations of baby power brokers on the country. The
politically connected officers knew the institutional bias was for loyalty to the regime and
functionality in the management of political corruption and money laundering. It should
come as no surprise the number of millionaire general officers in overgrown government
ministries and the banking sector.
This may seem odd for me to criticize a military education system that appears to
resemble that of the American Army, but the criticism is based more on the schizophrenic
approach and misplaced priorities of military leaders. Only General Obasanjo (Yoruba),
the man who turned over power to a democratically elected government, placed any real
emphasis on the professional education of his officers while he served as the military
head of state. At a time when the economic, education, and health care sectors were in a
shambles, successive military regimes responded by continuing to train soldiers
haphazardly without an overarching strategy, and often with inadequate budgets. Many
of the more professional officers began to wonder for what type of service were they
training, and grew cynical of the politically connected officers. The ethnic minority
41
coups of the 1980s and 1990s, along with massive early retirements illuminate this
growing rift in the army. With increasing ethnic violence fueled by a lack of opportunity,
would the Nigerian Army have a nation to protect, even if they did manage not to tear
themselves apart?
The Future of Education
The current government will probably be unable to raise education to the level it
deserves. In 1999 President Obasanjo launched a new initiative to extend national
primary education to nine years, but he failed to announce new funding for schools.30
Most of the state schools still lacked desks, chairs, books, and even chalk; and the
teachers’ pay was in arrears. The transfer of management of the federal allocation for
teachers' salaries and operational cost to the State Primary Education Boards has
succeeded in ensuring that teachers’ salaries are paid.31 These boards have also taken
over a number of roles originally the responsibility of local government under the new
administration. Education has a long way to recover, and years of corruption and
mismanagement of funds by both the federal government and local authorities cannot be
fixed overnight.
The 1999 World Bank assessment team did uncover a bright spot for democracy
in the education system. A high level of involvement in local primary schools by groups
such as PTAs, school committees, community-based organizations, and individual
community members speaks to the high regard most Nigerians have for education. The
community involvement made substantial contributions to their schools through the
construction of school buildings, repairs and maintenance, and the provision of furniture
and instructional materials.32 Many communities also participated in promoting the
42
enrollment and attendance of pupils.33 In the absence of army intervention, the grass
roots educators had uncovered the principles and practices of democratic governance and
citizenship. They were teaching civic knowledge, civic skills, and civic virtues that were
required for democracy but rarely demonstrated by the Supreme Commanders of Nigeria.
As lamentable as the primary schools are, the universities are also in horrible
shape. Nigerian universities have not been able to contribute to the information and
telecommunications revolution because of their emphasis on “solving contemporary
problems with traditional methods.”34 Education experts have challenged Nigerian
universities to evolve, and build university autonomy. 35 This void of intellectual capital,
at the post secondary level, hurts Nigeria the most. It is a sad fact that many of the
brightest Nigerians do not stay in the country. Access to a college education in Europe or
North America is often the start of a one-way trip. Distance learning, once hailed as the
savior of education, has yet to make a major contribution. The amazing potential still
underutilized due to a lack of infrastructure.36 So the constant funneling off of the best
and brightest continues.
After decades of isolation fostered by military rule, the education system is in
ruins. The World Banks assessment team and assistance will start progress, but it is
incumbent upon the government of Nigeria to pay more than lip service to the required
changes. If they intend on building the foundations for a democratic society and the
economic development that will sustain it, they have to start from the bottom. Military
governments clearly failed to institute educational reform in Nigeria. While several
military leaders claimed that Nigerians were unready for democracy as a means to
postpone or even suspend elections, they did little to rectify the situation. Perhaps they
43
believed that cultural evolution would proceed unaided by civic education; or more
likely, they simply did not care.
1Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria (New York: Public
Affairs Press, 2000), xviii.
2Global Information Networks in Education. Available from
http://www.ginie.org/ ginie-crises-links/edemo/, January 3, 2002.
3John J. Patrick, Global Trends in Civic Education, The Educational Resources
Information Center. Available from http://www.ed.gov/databases/ERIC_Digests/
ed410176.html, 3 January 2002
4Maier, xxiii.
5New Africa homepage, available from http://www.newafrica.com/education/
systems/nigeria.htm, 30 December 2001.
6Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: Bantam Books, 1980), 29.
7New Africa homepage.
8Ibid.
9Illinois State University, College of Education homepage, available from
http://www.coe.ilstu.edu/portfolios/students/vdnwoha/page02.htm, 30 December 2001.
10Ibid.
11New Africa homepage.
12World Desk Reference, Nigerian education available from http://travel.dk.com/
wdr/NG/mNG_Educ.htm, 2March 2001.
13Chuks Akunna, “Nigeria: World Bank apologies for failure of education
projects,” This Day (Nigeria) October 16, 2001, available from
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/stop-imf/2000q4/000297.html, 30 December 2001.
14Ibid.
15Ibid.
16The World Bank group homepage.
17Ibid.
44
18Ibid.
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
21World news homepage, available from http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/june99/
16_25_061.html, December 30, 2001.
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
24Jonathan C. Agwunobi, The Nigerian Military in a Democratic Society
(Kaduna: Olabola Graphics, 1992), 12.
25The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available
from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 2 Mar 2002.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
29Agwunobi68.
30BBC World Service homepage, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
world/africa/newsid_462000/462224.stm, December 29, 2001.
31The World Bank group homepage.
32Ibid.
33Ibid.
34Akunna.
35Ibid.
36Janet Jenkins, “Some trends in distance education in Africa: An examination of
the past and future role of distance education as a tool for national development,”
Distance Education--An International Journal, available from, http://www.usq.edu.au/
dec/DECJourn/v10n189/jenkins.htm; Internet.
45
CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(MILITARY FORCE TO CONTROL RESOURCES)
We must now reject for all time the conception of the state as a
foreign institution standing outside the community and whose
money, property and goals are not the direct responsibility and
concern of the community. The community is the government, and
the government is the community. It is no longer olu oyibo [white
man’s business]. Government business is truly and properly olu
obodo [community business].1
Ukpabi Asika
The economic situation in Nigeria is dire. By 1997 as the nation struggled in the
final death throws of General Sani-Abacha’s military regime the per capita annual
income had dropped to the equivalent of US$240.2 In 2000 this figure rose to about
US$260, but in real terms it was still below the income level of the population at
independence nearly four decades in the past. 3 Certainly, a trend that grows more
disturbing when you consider the fact that Nigeria had become the seventh largest oil
exporter on the planet.4 The question that must be answered by the military is in fact
very difficult to answer. With the tremendous oil wealth of Nigeria, the average Nigerian
has not prospered. Why have they not benefited? Since independence, the army has
ruled Nigeria 75 percent of the time. A few crooked politicians have not caused all of
Nigeria’s economic troubles. Mismanagement of resources has been a common
occurrence among all forms of Nigerian government. The existence of Nigeria as a
nation state speaks to the military’s success in stabilizing threats to national survival.
However, they have failed in every facet of development that could be counted as a
support base for democratic governance. In the last chapter, the failure was in education,
46
now the failure is even more tragic. The Army’s failing in the economic realm not only
failed to provide a basis for good governance; it deepened racial animosity with erratic
income distribution and created a disastrous climate in the army based on political power
and monetary gain.
While colonial rule was teaching Nigerians the lesson that might makes right, it
was teaching unintended economic lessons as well. Although some may argue the
altruistic intent of the British Empire, most would agree with the simplicity of their
Nigerian strategy. The maintenance of security in the colony to facilitate the extraction
of resources was the strategy. This reinforced a fundamental lesson to the Nigerian
Army. Get control of the resources by force if necessary and you hold the key to power.
The Nigerian officers, like the colonial rulers, would prefer stability to ensure the
efficient exploitation of resources.5 A law and order nation relies on coercion and
authoritarian leadership to retain power and control of resources, and the situation is now
ripe for military rule.6 In order to benefit from the natural resources the Nigerian
government centralized distribution at the government level. 7 As Nigerian citizens began
to see the accumulation of wealth at the federal level, the patron-client bond became the
political relationship of choice.8
Social programs were not a priority of the colonial government, as missionaries
and volunteer groups were allowed to handle any involvement on that level. The copying
of this tactic by Nigerian military leaders would have disastrous long-term economic
effects. This low regard for the citizenry caused Nigerians to develop a negative attitude
toward colonial government and subsequently a similar detachment from Nigerian
military government.9 Without a personal stake in their government’s survival, Nigerians
47
could feel free to advance private and tribal interests over the national government’s
interests.10 Rampant corruption, disregard for rule of law, and political instability are
suddenly understandable in this framework. Nigerians viewed any government treasury
as a “national cake,” a surplus amount of money to be targeted.11 This common view
also helps explain the reluctance of Nigerians to call for government accountability, and
the willingness to forgive corrupt government officials caught dining on the “national
cake.”
Economic development, the cornerstone of healthy economies, was also not
prioritized over rapid exploitation of natural resources by colonial Britain.12 Once again,
the Nigerian military retained an erroneous lesson. This living off the land phenomena
has been a painful lesson for Nigeria to outgrow. With a shortfall in civic duty related to
coercive regimes and the accompanying restrictions on entrepreneurship the nation
remains in a perpetual loop of resource exploitation. 13 They can never make the leap to
productive capitalism as long as they depend solely on resource exploitation at the
expense of development. The hand to mouth syndrome instead breeds petty capitalists in
the form of street vendors and black marketers. If nearly everyone has gotten the
economy wrong, then we can at least point out the largest offenders and illuminate the
cycle of abuse for what it is.
The First Republic and Gowan’s Regime (1960-1975)
The first ten years of independence included a slow economic start for Nigeria.
The colonial government handed the Nigerians a plan in name only, and the petroleum
kick start would come fast and prove too uncontrollable for the fledgling democracy.
The colonial government had a series of planned projects with no overarching economic
48
strategy. 14 The first national development plan for 1962-1968 was created by foreign
economists and included questionable projects that were in turn made more dubious when
modified by well-connected politicians.15 The First National Development Plan did
attempt to chart Nigeria's transition from an essentially agricultural economy to a mixed
economy based on agricultural expansion and limited industrial growth. The economists
and politicians had a vision for Nigeria, but limited means to get them to their goal, as
private investment was unable to generate sufficient capital for development.16 The plan
that would move Nigeria from a first wave economy to a second wave economy was
experiencing the friction predicted by Toffler.17 A power struggle erupted between
agricultural and industrialization in Nigeria as in other nations undergoing a clash
between first and second wave economies. The power struggle took on ethno-religious
overtones and began to spin the nation out of control, and towards the brink of national
survival.
Nigeria's first plan stressed production and profitability, not distribution. The
authors of the first plan had argued that a “premature preoccupation with equity problems
will backfire and prevent any development from taking place.”18 However people who
already owned property, held influential positions, and had good educations were poised
to profit from the economic growth of Nigeria. In a land of already stressed ethnic fault
lines, the growing inequality was raising the level of animosity towards the government
of the first republic. The population, over hyped by independence and democracy,
wanted their democracy dividend immediately.
The income distribution problem would prove to be one of the most volatile
issues in Nigerian politics. Before 1959 the regional governments retained all revenues
49
from mineral and agricultural products. After 1959 the region retained only a fraction of
the revenue from natural resource production (oil/minerals) while the revenue from
agricultural exports remained under regional control.19 This policy clearly benefited the
agricultural interests of northern Nigeria. The Hausa-Fulani of the north would benefit
from their agricultural production while also reaping the benefits of the nation’s oil
reserves that were outside their region. The policy created severe unrest in the Eastern
Region of the Igbos, as they had few agricultural exports and the preponderance of the oil
wealth was coming from their region. By the late 1960s oil had become the country's
biggest foreign exchange earner. The linkage between oil, the Igbos, and government
dissatisfaction holds up if you note that the first coup plotters (January 1966) were
spearheaded by the actions of an idealistic young major of eastern descent named Kaduna
Nzeogwu. In addition, the first military head of state was an Igbo general, Thomas
Ironsi, who stepped in to accept control of the government in the wake of the disjoined
coup effort. Unfortunately for the Igbos the northern officers struck back (July 1966) as
detailed in chapter 2. The struggle for control of the oil revenues, and the accompanying
ethnic cleansing, among numerous other factors, plunged the nation into civil war. With
northern officers in control of government and pursuing the interests of their supporters
in the north, the subjugation of Nigeria’s minority tribes could be undertaken.
After the civil war, General Gowon’s military government struggled to regain
control of the national economy. Postwar reconstruction, the restoration of productive
capacity, and achieving national self-reliance were major goals of Gowon’s National
Development Plan (1970-74).20 The replacement cost of physical assets damaged and
50
destroyed in the civil war with the southeast, was estimated to exceed N600 million (then
about US$900 million).
Gowon received unexpected support for his plan when Nigeria's real growth in
GDP between 1970 and 1974 nearly doubled the projected amount due to oil industry
growth and sharply increasing oil prices that propelled the economy forward at an
alarming rate.21 By 1971 Nigeria was already the world's seventh-largest petroleum
producer, and much of the revenue intended for investment to diversify the economy,
spurred inflation and widened the gap in income distribution. 22 The Ministry of
Economic Development, unprepared for the windfall in revenue, approved and added
numerous questionable projects that brought government corruption to new heights.23
The economy slowed suddenly in 1975 because of the sudden decrease in world demand.
Prices moved downward and the Gowon military government that had ridden the oil
boom was shaken on the economic front.
The economy had also failed to diversify in part due to the first of the
indigenization decrees, passed in 1972, which barred non-Nigerians from investing in
specified enterprises and reserved participation in certain trades to Nigerians (70 percent
of commercial firms operating in Nigeria were foreign owned).24 Unemployment was
becoming a serious problem as the “large numbers of [rural] farm workers, who had gone
to urban areas in search of higher wages, remained in the cities even if they failed to find
jobs.”25 The clash of agriculture and industrialization was happening, and the proponents
of industrialization were not winning. Unemployment was epidemic in the east, where
the economy was still recovering from the civil war, and skilled Igbo workers were
reluctant to leave the east in search of work for fear of ethnic persecution. 26 Large
51
numbers of mostly northern soldiers without job prospects made demobilization of the
military establishment impossible, especially when the north was dealing with the worst
drought in six decades between 1972 and 1974. Gowon was under increasing pressure
from all sides. He had to reintegrate the Igbos without hurting northern financial
interests.
The end of the Gowon regime was not far off. Amid the grumblings of
inefficiency and corruption, hunger, and inflation, Gowon chose the 1974 independence
celebration to announce that the 1976 date to hand over to civilians was unrealistic.27 A
group of coup plotters, including Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Garba, Gowon’s brother-inlaw,
began work to end Gowon’s rule. Gowon’s desperation to gain popular support and
diversify the economy was evident in the Third National Development Plan (1975-80) of
March 1975. With an increase of public expenditures twelve times that of the previous
plan Gen Gowon was using all the tools at his disposal to stay in power.28 The document
outlined ambitious plans to expand agriculture, industry, transport, housing, water
supplies, health facilities, education, rural electrification, community development, and
state programs.29 These were designed in part to maintain the patron-client relationships
Gowon depended on for his power base by supplying them with fat new contracts. At the
same time, a government commission doubled civil administrators’ wages further
draining the national reserve.30
Gowon’s program of “Nigerianization” recommended by the business insiders,
coupled with the spike in oil prices, had made a few civil servants, military leaders, and
insiders wealthy but had discouraged foreign investment.31 Farm exports were down,
foreign investment was down, the price of oil was falling, and the people were angry.
52
The inflation of minimum wage and administrative salaries combined with the slowing of
the oil-based economy culminated with a failure of the federal government to pay
monthly subsidies to state and local governments in June of 1975.32 The plot that had
started in 1974 removed Gowon in time to stop massive strikes and keep vital service
from stopping countrywide.33 Could anyone govern Nigeria, and get the economy back
on track?
Muhammed, Obsanjo and the Second Republic (1975-1983)
The end of the second military government and the beginning of the next was
seen by many as a shuffling of the deck among the army’s elite. However, General
Muhammed (Hausa), brought into power by the bloodless coup organized by Joseph
Garba in July 1975, wanted to get the army out of government.34 General Muhammed
would strengthen the tradition of Northern dominance of both the military and
government, but Muhammed was committed to civilian rule. Muhammed tried to reduce
government waste and corruption by eliminating or replacing thousands of civil servants,
and announcing a timetable for return to civilian rule.35 This was the type of leadership a
military government should provide, stability, and rapid civilian transition; the prevention
of what Robert Kaplan calls “the anarchic implosion of criminal violence,” while
transitioning to civilian rule.36 Unfortunately, supporters of Gowon were still waiting in
the wings, desiring the return to their patron-client relationship facilitated by his
government. General Muhammed, assassinated in February of 1976 by Lieutenant
Colonel Dimka’s boys, would never see the Army’s good name cleared. His second in
command avoided the squad sent for him. General Obasanjo, a Yoruba Christian,
stepped in to lead Nigeria and execute Muhammed’s timetable for transition to civilian
53
rule. He also set about to purge the system of a number of the remaining Gowon
supporters.37
“In response to an economy overheated by demands for new programs and higher
wages,” General Obasanjo pointed out “that petroleum revenue was not a cure-all.”38 He
postponed, scaled down, or canceled projects when falling oil revenue could no longer
sustain the spending. Corruption was still stalking the Nigerians, as many projects were
retained for political reasons, not because they were socially or economically useful.39
One social casualty of the cuts already discussed in chapter 3 occurred in 1978 when the
federal government returned much of the financial responsibility for housing and primary
education to state and local governments who were cash poor, with the resulting lowering
of quality of life and education for Nigerians.40 General Obasanjo’s short term in office,
1976-1979, following the even shorter stint of his assassinated boss, General Muhammed
from 1975-1976, did little to reverse the economic situation he inherited from General
Gowon. The Second Republic would step into a grave economic situation.
President Shehu Shagari took office on October 1, 1979 amid “falling oil
revenues and an increased need for imported food that had resulted from delays in
agricultural modernization.”41 Infrastructure upgrades and maintenance suffered as the
ability to import construction materials fell with Nigeria’s buying power. Growth in the
construction, transport, communications, utilities, and housing sectors plummeted.42
Federal government finances were in a free fall between 1981 and 1983, with the federal
government deficit reaching N5.3 billion (9.5 percent of GDP).43 This economic crisis
was built on a belief that oil prices would climb eventually, and was spurred on by the
corruption of government officials accustomed to a lifestyle of excess funded by the
54
“national cake.” The administration had even heaped some of the excess spending on the
military. In an attempt to placate the military, the civilian administration was generous
with the defense budget and lucrative government contracts to well-connected military
officers.44
One obvious sign of corruption in the government was easy for everyone to see.
President Shagari was reluctant to devalue the Naira. When inflation topped 20 percent
per year, foreign investment dwindled.45 Devaluing the Naira would have helped the
economy but hurt the Swiss bank accounts of the ruling party. The politicians were
bleeding Nigeria dry, and the public knew it. Nigeria owed US$6 billion on trade credit
by the end of 1983.46 The economic crisis combined with the rigged 1983 elections had
the public to the boiling point, and as discussed in the introduction, the public nearly
invited the Army back. The oil boom of the late General Gowon regime, the leadership
of General Muhammed and the transition of General Obsanjo had led some Nigerians to
believe that the army was still better equipped than the politicians to govern the nation.
In reality, many in the army elite had become politicians and their interrelations with
influential executives were rotting the army from the inside, as subsequent military
regimes would prove. Nevertheless, the army had done better with the economy than the
civilians had in the past, and some Nigerians may even have believed they were
supporting the lesser of two evils. With the economic progress of the previous two
decades erased, the question of governance had changed once again. Some Nigerians
may have believed that General Gowon had been correct in the mid 1970s when he
asserted that the civilians were not ready to govern Nigeria. They were about to
reconsider their support to military run governments and military economies.
55
Buhari, Babangida, and Abacha (1983-1999)
The second republic ended on New Years Eve 1983, and Major General
Muhammadu Buhari came to power riding a crest of public resentment of the corruption
in government and economic mismanagement to say nothing of the anger over the rigged
1983 elections.47 To his credit, General Buhari (Hausa) attempted to get spending under
control and took a tough stand to end financial corruption. Early in his administration, he
closed down Nigeria by sealing the land borders, closed the international airports for
several days, replaced all old naira notes with new currency bills, and introduced tough
exchange-control regulations designed to control the black market exchange of Nigerian
currency. 48 His government cut spending for capital imports, civil service and armed
forces salaries, and consumer subsidies.49 The federal deficit was decreasing, but Buhari
had placed himself in a politically weak position by severing many of the old patronclient
ties with the powerful business leaders, by alienating his own party (the army) and
by alienating the populace with his black market reforms. Coincidently the planned
spending cuts that were part of the fifth national budget plan unveiled by General Buhari
coincided with his removal in a palace coup.50 General Buhari, replaced by his third in
command, saw his national budget plan postponed amid the rhetoric of the opportunistic
General Babangida (Hausa).
The Fifth National Development Plan, originally drafted by General Buhari’s
administration, was postponed until 1988-92. The fifth plan's objectives were to
“devalue the Naira, remove import licenses, reduce tariffs, open the economy to foreign
trade, promote nonoil exports through incentives, and achieve national self-sufficiency in
food production through improvements in labor productivity, privatization of public
56
enterprises, and government measures to create employment opportunities.”51 However,
after a year in place the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida abandoned the
five-year national plan in 1989 and initiated a three-year rolling plan. Upon closer
inspection, the three-year rolling plan bears a striking resemblance to the Planning
Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) in use by the Department of Defense in the
United States. The Nigerian Army had adopted the plan in 1986, and Babangida was
bringing the government budget process in line with the process recently adopted by the
army.52 Still plagued by corruption and self-interest, Nigeria needed not only a unifying
strategy and another budget model they needed selfless execution. What they got was a
revised plan with loftier objectives: “to reduce inflation and exchange rate instability,
maintain infrastructure, achieve agricultural self-sufficiency, and reduce the burden of
structural adjustment on the most vulnerable social groups.”53
General Babangida’s government came to power at a time of depressed oil prices,
and undertook a structural adjustment program (SAP) between 1986 and 1988.54 This
action opened the way for an international monetary fund (IMF) agreement and debt
rescheduling, but the military government declined the offer. Instead, Babangida
skillfully played the World Bank against the IMF for public relations gains.55 General
Babangida needed to build a power base at home, and by thumbing his nose at the IMF
he played upon the themes of Nigeria pride and prestige in the face of adversity with
great domestic impact. After a rejection of IMF terms for borrowing, the military
government agreed to impose similar terms and was approved by the World Bank. A
domestic victory for General Babangida as Nigerians initially rallied to the patriotic feel
of Nigerian dictating terms to the IMF and World Bank. In October 1986 Nigeria
57
received US$1,020 million in quickly disbursed loans and $4,280 million in three-year
project loans.56 Stability in the domestic and international economy was achieved at the
expense of internal security as wages and government social spending continued to drop
during General Babangida’s term in office. On social spending, it was more of General
Buhari’s hard line, but with a fresh dose of propaganda and national zeal.
The decrease in spending on social programs contributed to often violent
domestic unrest, such as Muslim-Christian riots in Kaduna State in March 1987, urban
rioting in April 1988 in response to reduced gasoline subsidies, student-led violence in
opposition to government economic policies in May and June 1989, and the second coup
attempt against General Babangida in April 1990. Babangida was wedded to his SAP,
and his regime raised the stakes declaring there was no alternative and used force to put
down student demonstrations that demanded a more humane approach to the economic
problems.57 The SAP required more fiscal discipline than the Babangida regime could
muster, as the increased revenue generated from depreciating the Naira was used to fund
dubious projects and create extra government agencies. While the connected got richer
the standard of living and quality of life for the average Nigerian deteriorated as the per
capita income of $778 in 1985 shrank to $105 in 1989 and resulted in Nigeria being
named the thirteenth poorest nation in the world in a 1991 World Bank report.58 The UN
Development Program report in 1990 was harsher, stating that Nigeria had “the worst
human deprivation of any country in the third world”.59
Perhaps Babangida was using the SAP to hold on to power. The Bretton Woods
Institute stated that a “democracy was not possible without the entrenchment of market
force.”60 This theory had created the feeling in Nigeria that a democratic transition was
58
less likely to succeed if undertaken at the same time as an SAP, and this corollary was
being used to prolong the life of the regime.61 The transition date moved from October
1990 to October 1992 than to January 1993 and finally to June 1993. The 1993 elections
were annulled when it became apparent that Abiola (Yoruba) would win. The patronclient
ties to Babangida were too strong, and his clients would not have their interests
jeopardized by a southerner. General Babangida was in a tough spot, directly between
the pressure of the citizens over the annulled elections and his wealthy and powerful
allies behind the scenes. Finally, General Babangida stepped aside appointing an interim
government that amounted to little more than a cooling off period. The interim
government of Ernest Shonekun had little power and little direction, as General Sani-
Abacha retained control of the military as the Defence Minister.62
General Sani-Abacha (Hausa) was waiting in the wings to assist in the destruction
of the interim government. General Abacha cleverly orchestrated a voluntary
relinquishment of power by Ernest Shonekun, and began ousting Babangida’s associates
to deal with the national economic crisis on a purely opportunistic propaganda level. 63
General Abacha’s program that gathered popular support among common Nigerians
became known as the “war on the rich.”64 The heart of his program, a no sacred cows
approach, goes far in explaining Abacha’s information campaign to legitimize the actions
he would later take to protect his regime. Many of Abacha’s actions were explained
away by his overarching campaign: the trials of the heads of failed banks, the trial, jail
terms of retired officers like Olesgun Obasanjo, the jailing of political leaders, like the
elected president Abiola, the harassment and jailing of journalists, and at the height of his
perceived powers, the invasion of Ogoniland, and the killing of Saro-Wiwa and the
59
Ogoni chiefs.65 Was there any real proof that Abacha’s trials and the war on the rich,
were not just charades to eliminate his political enemies? Unfortunately, most of the
evidence points to his personal agenda rather than a national focus.66 The failed bank
decree, circulated as a plan to recoup huge sums deposited in the banks by retired and
serving officers, only resulted in the arraignment of two officers.67 While Abacha waged
his private war to recover Nigeria’s squandered wealth, the most serious problems of the
economy were getting worse: Rising unemployment, skyrocketing inflation and
insecurity of life and property were crushing Nigeria’s economy.68
General Abacha’s fragile economic situation was also rocked by acts of civil
disobedience and sluggish economic performance. Persistent riots and strikes resulted in
anarchy in many parts of the nation and paralyzed the economy. His regime reacted by
creating a state-controlled economy with a fixed Naira exchange rate of N22 to US$1.00,
a fixed interest rate of 21 percent, local sourcing of raw materials, and duties on selected
imports.69 These actions only served to create a huge black market in foreign exchange
while filling the pockets of government officials nullifying the perception that Abacha
was truly interested in dealing with corruption in Nigeria. In addition, Nigeria began to
feel the effects of an oil industry slowdown. The Nigerian National Power Company
alone owed the oil companies US$800 million. Indebtedness and low prices forced oil
exploration down from 1.5 million barrels in 1991 to 500 million in 1994.70 Abacha’s
response was pure insanity; he sacked the experienced oilmen and replaced many with
retired military officers.71 All the while, Abacha’s government was destroying the SAP
of Babangida by circumventing western creditors like the IMF and the World Bank by
60
refusing to service their debt and paying for imports either in cash or by commodity
exchange; arrears on debt servicing climbed to US$2.5 billion in 1994.72
The pressure of Abacha’s economic decisions continued to add pressure to his
regime, and in 1995 he deregulated the economy. The removal of economic subsidies on
internal petroleum sales and the floating of the Naira sent inflation soaring by 150 percent
increasing the misery on Nigerians and increasing the domestic pressure on Abacha to
transition the government to democracy. 73 Abacha began talk of a transition program
with the creation of the new five-party state with himself the candidate of all five
parties.74 The rigged program had little effect, and Nigeria’s status as a pariah state with
a failing economy continued through Abacha’s death in 1998.
General Abdusalam Abubakar stepped in and reinstated a transition program with
a more democratic flavor as he released Abacha’s political prisoners and scrapped the
five political parties established by Abacha.75 General Abubakar, who later gained
acceptance to the US Army Command and General Staff College international officer
hall of fame, instituted a transition program that ended with the successful elections of
1999.
President Olesgun Obsanjo, now an elected official, inherited an economy weaker
than the one he passed to the second republic some twenty years earlier. The econmony
had not flourished since his retirement and subsequent jailing by General Abacha.
However, by stopping the outright looting of the government funds, his administration
could point to a US $7 billion increase in foreign exchange reserves and a near tripling of
the Lagos stock exchange in the first two years in office.76 Detractors can point to a 25
percent inflation rate and a 43 percent increase in money supply over the same period.
61
This coupled with a continuation in wasteful spending (US$350 million for a sports
stadium in Abuja, and US$93 Million for a space program) lead some to say that this is
the Nigerian status quo.77 Obasanjo still has the IMF on his side, as he convinced them in
2000 to reschedule 23.5 billion of Nigeria’s 33.5 billion in foreign debt.78 Nigeria could
not meet repayment on debt that amounted to more than 75 percent of GDP while trying
to build roads, schools, and health clinics, as Obasanjo claimed that Nigerians needed to
see a “democracy dividend.”79
Obasanjo will continue to champion the Nigerian economy while he tries to hold
the republic together. The economy is his first enemy, and he knows it. Harsh economic
conditions and resource scarcity will enflame ethnic clashes and lead to an ungovernable
Nigeria. Obasanjo summed up his problem in dealing with the legacy resulting from
years of economic corruption and mismanagement at a meeting of Commonwealth heads
of government in 1999:
Nigerians want to see a democracy dividend in terms of improvement in
their quality of life. . . . If we cannot show that they’re getting something they will
be frustrated and frustration is dangerous.80
A stable Nigeria free of military coups is dependent on economic stability,
reliable food production, payment for civil servants, and opportunities for its citizens
outside of corruption and organized crime. It is no coincidence that the first goal of U.S.
policy in Africa is economic prosperity. Without it, all governments are inherently
unstable.81 Stability by armed force or coercion is a temporary but often necessary step
to end a cycle of violence. The Nigerian Army’s experiment has proved that prolonged
military rule with its inevitable personality based instability is disastrous to long-term
economic growth. Militarism has rarely been conducive to capitalism over a prolonged
62
period. In the process of crushing true capitalism with indigenization decrees, corruption,
and greed, the military destroyed its professional ethos while reinforcing the selfish “me
first” mentality of the colonial economy they inherited.
1Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1998), 22.
2Nigeria Economic Development and Indicators, available from http://www.
newafrica.com; Internet; accessed on 22 January 2002.
3World Bank Group: Nigeria; available from http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/AFR/
afr.nsf/fd9617f4da37892b852567cf004d9080/dc8738a1d6ca9623852567d1004b91c4?Op
enDocument; Internet; available on 13 April 2002.
4Nigeria Economic Development and Indicators.
5Osaghae, 12.
6Ibid., 19.
7Ibid.
8Ibid., 20.
9Ibid., 21.
10Ibid.
11Ibid., 22.
12Ibid., 12.
13Ibid., 22.
14The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: A Country Study; available from
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html; Internet; accessed on 19 January 2002.
15Ibid.
16Ibid.
17Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: Bantam Books, 1980), 13.
18The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: A Country Study.
63
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
25Ibid.
26Ibid.
27Nigeria: Chronology of the Struggle for Stability and Democracy; available
from http://allafrica.com/stories; Internet; accessed on 24January 2001.
28The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available
from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: A Country Study; available from
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html; Internet; accessed on 19 January 2002.
32Ibid.
33Nigeria: Chronology of the Struggle for Stability and Democracy.
34U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs web site, available from
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/2836.htm; Internet; accessed on 25 January 2002.
35Ibid.
36Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy” Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold
War (New York: Random House, 2000), 12.
37Richard Akinnola, “Fellow Countrymen…” The Story of Coup D’etats in
Nigeria (Ikeja: Rich Consult, 2000), 45.
38The Library of Congress, Webpage, Nigeria: A Country Study.
39Ibid.
64
40Ibid.
41Ibid.
42Ibid.
43Ibid.
44Akin O. Akindele, The Military Franchise (Chapel Hill: Professional Press,
1993), 57.
45The Library of Congress, Webpage, Nigeria: A Country Study.
46Ibid.
47U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, web site available from
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/2836.htm; Internet; accessed on 25 January 02.
48The Library of Congress, Webpage, Nigeria: A Country Study.
49Ibid.
50Ibid.
51Ibid.
52Jonathan C. Agwunobu, The Nigerian Military in a Democratic Society
(Kaduna: Olabola Graphic Press, 1992), 90.
53The Library of Congress, Webpage, Nigeria: A Country.
54Ibid.
55Ibid.
56Ibid.
57Osaghae.
58Ibid., 204.
59Ibid.
60Ibid.
61Ibid., 208.
62Ibid., 262.
65
63Ibid., 273.
64Ibid., 280.
65Tom Mbeke-Ekanem, “Beyond Execution” Understanding the Ethnic and
Military Politics in Nigeria (Lincoln: Writer’s Showcase, 2000), 167.
66Ibid.
67Osaghae, 280.
68Ibid., 280.
69Ibid., 282.
70Ibid., 281.
71Ibid., 282.
72Ibid.
73Ibid., 285.
74Tom Mbeke-Ekanem, “Beyond Execution” Understanding the Ethnic and
Military Politics in Nigeria (Lincoln: Writer’s Showcase, 2000), 254.
75Ibid., 280.
76“More Pain, Little Gain: The World Wants President Obasanjo to Succeed, but
He is Failing to Make the Economy work,” Economist 360, no. 8232 (28 July 2001): 45.
77Ibid., 45.
78“Nigeria’s Democracy Divided,” Economist 357, no. 8201 (16 December 2000):
54.
79Ibid., 54.
80African National Congress Daily News Briefing, Webpage, available from
http://www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/1999/news1113; Internet; 17 March 2002.
81Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001;
available from http://www.state.gov/www/budget/fy2001/fn150/forops_full/150fy01_fo_
africa.html; Internet, accessed on 22 February 2002
66
CHAPTER 5
FOREIGN POLICY
Nigeria, which claims African leadership, must turn concertedly
and even aggressively to a new focus on foreign policy. For most
countries, there are times when foreign policy is a mere extension
of domestic politics. Africa’s situation in general, and Nigeria’s in
particular, are too critical for that now. It seems to me that for too
long, foreign policy has been the least of our concerns.1
General Joseph Garba, Minister of External Affairs
To continue from the point expounded upon by General Garba in 1990, it is
necessary to look at both the thirty-year record of Nigerian foreign policy critiqued by
Garba and the following nine years of military status quo before the birth of the third
republic in 1999. A peek into the Nigerian collective spirit as displayed by their military
leaders in the prosecution of foreign policy is helpful in predicting the reactions of
Nigerians to Western policies affecting Africa.
Ethnic rivalries and military infighting to control power in Nigeria over a period
of 40 years would seem to reinforce the importance of internal security issues to military
leaders. However, the Nigeria of independence was beyond such trivial concerns,
African leadership was her birthright. Nigeria, much like a genetically gifted and
underachieving athlete, has never quite lived up to the African leadership role for which
she was destined. By failing to fix her own internal problems, Nigeria saw her chances at
leadership continually slip away. Foreign policy has continued its evolution in Nigeria,
and sometimes the overextension of her resources has been evident. At times it appeared
that Nigeria saw development of the African continent as Nigeria’s cross to bear as she
attempted to start an African renaissance that could bring the economic prosperity,
67
stability and leadership birthright home to Nigeria. Nigerian pride certainly runs deep,
but her foreign policy motives are not always completely rational or even altruistic.
Factors conditioning Nigeria's foreign policy positions are summarized in the
1991 Library of Congress country study:
1) The ethnic and religious mix of the country required cautious positions on
some issues, such as policy toward Israel . . . because of Muslim opposition and
sympathy with the rest of the Arab Muslim world.
2) Nigeria's legacy as an ex-British colony, combined with its energy-producing
role in the global economy, predisposed Nigeria to be pro-Western on most issues
despite the desire to maintain a nonaligned status to avoid neocolonialism. . . .
3) The country's membership in and commitment to several international
organizations . . . affected foreign policy positions.
4) As the most populous country in Africa and the entire black world, Nigeria
perceived itself as the “giant” of Africa and the potential leader of the black race.
Thus, Nigerian external relations have emphasized African issues, which have
become the avowed cornerstone of foreign policy. 2
These Nigerian factors have resulted in a dominant position for some recurring
issues, but as discussed in earlier chapters successive military governments lost some of
Nigeria’s core issues as they became increasingly preoccupied with their own patron
client relations and the maintenance of power at the expense of rational foreign policy.
Lest anyone think the military was not always in control of all facets of Nigerian policy,
you need only consider the comments of one of Nigeria’s most moderate but effective
military rulers. General Obasanjo stated that, “Foreign policy making . . . resided in
Dodan barracks,” and the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministers were
“instrument of input and instrument of execution.”3 Perception management towards the
international community would vary greatly as Nigeria continued her march from hopeful
independence to global pariah.
68
Colonial-Independence-First Republic (1960-1966)
During the 1950s and early 1960s, Nigerian foreign policy “aimed at proper
behavior in the international system,” as the British government continued to have major
influence on Nigeria’s foreign relations.4 Predictably, Nigeria’s First Republic had a
western democratic feel that stressed “world peace, equal respect for sovereignty, and
nonalignment based on friendship with any country that took a reciprocal position.” 5
Nigeria’s most serious foreign policy contributions during the First Republic occurred
through UN participation. Admission occurred within a week of independence in 1960,
and Nigeria assumed a position as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council.6
Nigeria contributed personnel to many UN peacekeeping missions, including operations
in Tanzania, and the UN India/Pakistan Observer Mission in the 1960s. Nigeria’s earliest
major contribution to peacekeeping operations came in Zaire (now the Democratic
Republic of the Congo), and by 1964 the Nigerian contingent, under General Ironsi
(Igbo) was the predominant member of UN force.7 However, the birth of an organization
that reflected the increasingly hard-line stances of many new African states would cast
doubts in the minds of many Nigerians. In the era of Nigeria’s First Republic Africa saw
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established on May 25, 1963 at Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, with an established purpose to “promote the unity and solidarity of the African
states; defend the sovereignty of members; eradicate all forms of colonialism; promote
international cooperation . . . , coordinate and harmonize member states economic,
diplomatic, educational, health, welfare, scientific and defense policies.”8 Nigeria’s
foreign policy suddenly seemed timid by comparison.
69
Generals Ironsi, Gowon and the Biafran Civil War (1960-1975)
Nigerian critics of the First Republic believed “that the government had been too
pro-Western and not strong enough on decolonization or integration, and that the low
profile had been embarrassing.”9 The idealistic young Major Nzeogwu (Igbo) had
initiated Nigeria’s first coup which placed General Ironsi’s (Igbo) in office for six months
in 1966 partially under the auspice of correcting the rampant corruption, but the foreign
prestige and international political thread was also apparent in his post coup rhetoric.10
General Ironsi’s short stint is a little more than a blip on the screen for Nigerian foreign
policy. General Gowon (Northern-aligned middle-belt Christian), that came to power in
mid 1966 in the reprisal coup that toppled Ironsi, would make the first attempts at foreign
policy by a Nigerian military government.
The domestic attacks on Gowon’s foreign policy were based on his inclination to
base foreign policy decision on personal relationships.11 His personal assurance that a
future West African economic organization would be headquartered in Togo where his
friend, General Eyadema, was in power and his threat to send troops to Niger to prevent a
coup against another friend undermined his credibility at home.12 He also signed away
Nigeria’s oil rich Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon as a repayment for President Ahidjo’s
support during the Biafran civil war.13 These moves violated the Nigerian principle of
prestige while demonstrating little regard for economic development at home. Nigerians
would never offer such prestige to other West African countries at her expense. Gowon’s
talk of military intervention under questionable circumstances began the alienation of the
military professionals that were keeping him in power. Even more damning domestically
70
was the criticism that Gowon was using Nigeria’s oil wealth as a handout program
throughout Africa to increase his personal prestige.14
Whatever his motivation or technique, Gowon was making tentative steps toward
engaging his African neighbors. In addition to the foreign policy priorities of the First
Republic, General Gowon placed renewed emphasis on “pan-African solidarity through
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), regional cooperation, support for anti-colonial
and liberation movements--particularly those in southern Africa--and nonalignment in the
East-West conflict.”15 But Gowon’s domestic problem with the breakaway Igbos in
Biafra was going to affect his Africa-centric foreign policy. African criticism of General
Gowon’s government increased as the civil war dragged on. While the OAU initially
issued a statement in 1967 backing the federal position on national unity, they continued
efforts to bring about a cease-fire as the death toll and ethnic overtones increased.16
Post-civil war policy was distinctly different from previous Nigerian foreign
policy. White-dominated African countries had supported the Igbo’s in Biafra, and the
OAU had sided with Gowon’s military government by voting for unity. 17 On the global
stage, the break was even more apparent. While the African schism was to be expected
and only served to reinforce and validate Nigeria’s anti-South Africa sentiment, the
repercussions globally affected Nigeria’s world alignment. General Gowon turned to the
Soviet Union for support after the West refused to provide arms to defeat Biafra.18 The
postwar cooling to the west and some of Gowon’s reluctance to make Western-style
democratic reform found their origins in the civil war.
To reinforce African ties and reward his supporters, General Gowon decided to
sell crude oil at reduced prices to African countries.19 Subsidizing African countries
71
“enhanced Nigeria's influence in Africa while building African solidarity,” and led
directly to Nigeria’s power position in the creation of the Economic Community of
Western States (ECOWAS).20 ECOWAS was formed in 1975 with a mission to promote
economic development in “all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport,
telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and
financial matters, social and cultural issues.”21 In other words, Nigeria was fashioning a
power base and a stage from which to make her bid for African leadership. But Gowon’s
decision-making style and lack of coherent plan were troubling to many in the military,
and they sought a change.
Generals Muhammed, Obasanjo, and the Second Republic (1975-1984)
The military leaders that toppled General Gowon from within his organization
selected army leaders that would launch the most aggressive foreign policy in Nigerian
history. A foreign policy and nationalism push that coincides with the establishment of
the officer professional education institutions discussed in chapter 3. Muhammed and
Obasanjo set about to educate Nigeria’s officers for the strategic environment they saw
the country headed towards. Nigeria had the economic muscle on the crest of the oil
price wave and coupled with a global community that was suddenly exposed and
vulnerable to fossil fuel shortages, she was poised to advance her national interests.22
In 1975, following closely behind the coup, Nigeria expressed her “urgent goals”
for foreign policy that included “blocking South African aggression and long range
domination in the sub-region, and to secure stability in post-independence Angola.”23
This strengthened Africa focus meant Nigeria voiced her strong objections to Portuguese
colonization not only in Angola but also in Mozambique and condemned minority rule in
72
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) almost as vehemently as they had in South Africa.24
However, it was Nigeria’s policy to eradicate apartheid in South Africa and the
subsequent “invasion” of Angola by South Africa that forced Nigeria to adopt a policy
that had it on collision course with the United States when they backed the socialist party
in Angola.25 The commitment of General Murtala Muhammad to back the Movimento
Popular de Libertação de Angola's (MPLA) ascent to power in Angola provided the
critical swing vote in the OAU decision to recognize the MPLA. 26 This move furthered
the rift in U.S. Nigerian relations. A U.S. that was antisocialist, Africa-ignorant and pro-
South African “insulted” the Nigerians on their own continent, resulting in a tersely
worded response from General Muhammed essentially telling the U.S. “to go to hell.”27
The rift had already widened earlier in 1975 when General Obasanjo had forced the
withdrawal of the U.S. embassy with military force to allow Nigerians to use the
building, but now the Nigerians were being more than just forceful in their sovereignty. 28
The perception of a danger to U.S. interests in Africa was becoming more focused on
Nigeria as an antagonist.
During this time Nigeria described her foreign policy as nonideological, an
attempt at explanation to the world’s cold war superpowers. Nigeria’s attempts to
mediate in the South African-Angolan crisis followed by the Angola-Zaire Crisis and her
support to the OAU in the Ethiopian-Somali dispute caused controversy at home as well
as causing confusion in the East-West ideological war.29 While Nixon and Ford favored
South Africa, despite white minority rule, because it was more stable and would keep
chaos and thereby communism out of Africa, Nigeria’s anticolonial policies had no such
anticommunist flavor.30 Nigeria’s Army that had fought on the continent to keep the
73
peace and had fought to unite its country found it odd that a heterogeneous nation like the
U.S., with the second largest black population on the planet, could not understand
Nigeria’s fight to end colonization and oppression regardless of the ideology chosen by
indigenous peoples.31
The next dramatic change in Nigerian foreign policy came with the election of
Jimmy Carter as president of the United States. A month after inauguration in 1977
Carter sent his ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, to Nigeria.32 Although
the issues of South Africa and Zimbabwe were hanging over their heads, dialogue was
open. A visit by General Obasanjo to Washington in October 1977 was followed six
months later with the first visit of an American president to Africa since Roosevelt had
made a stopover in Liberia during a World War II trip to Casablanca.33 The growing
closeness created new enthusiasm as Nigeria’s military leaders prepared for elections and
the country drafted a new constitution. The 1979 constitution contained familiar
cornerstones of Nigerian foreign policy that the military would handover to the Second
Republic: promotion of African unity; political, economic, social, and cultural liberation
of Africa; international cooperation; and elimination of racial discrimination. 34
The government of Shehu Shagari, elected in 1979, maintained the status quo of
the previous military government concerning foreign policy. A typical assessment of
Shagari’s foreign policy:
Nigeria’s foreign policy remained at the level of routine observance of
existing relations and obligations. . . . The four years of the regime were,
therefore, a period of recess for Nigeria’s foreign policy. 35
Democracy supporters argued that assessments like this “underplayed the difference in
foreign policy between military government . . . and a democratic one.”36 The legislative
74
controls of the democracy constrained the unilateral decisions that could be made and in
fact were made by military governments in Nigeria. President Shagari, a political pupil
of Balewa (First Republic), adopted a “conservative, cautious, pro-Western, and
sometimes unpopular” foreign policy stance.37 His cautious stance and desire to find
peaceful means to end a dispute were as unpopular at home as his lack of boisterous
rhetoric to the west. The border disputes with Chad and Cameroon provided the Shagari
government an opportunity to consider military action, which it did not take.38 The lack
of a response was timid to many senior officers that saw this as another decline in
Nigerian status.39 Once again, the drop in prestige, and the reduction in anticolonial
rhetoric through relations with the west were contributing factors to the end of a republic.
Generals Buhari, Babangida, Abacha, and the Birth
of the Third Republic (1984-1999)
General Buhari stepped in after the fall of the second republic in 1984 to
reestablish the foreign policy of the Muhammed/Obasanjo era, even going so far as to
bring back their external affairs minister Joe Garba and selecting him as the country’s
permanent representative to the United Nations.40 General Buhari also moved
immediately to correct the lack of action with regard to Chad and Cameroon by sending
troops to the borders.41 Buhari’s downfall was truly economically related (covered in
chapter 4) as the price of oil continued to fall and as Nigeria saw her external power base
erode in conjunction with domestic unrest. The end of Buhari was at hand.
General Babangida, who forced Buhari out of office, maintained the same initial
foreign policy apparatus and focused on placating some domestic issues to solidify his
power base. His foreign policy machine, while maintaining the tenets of
75
Muhammed/Obasanjo, would play for bigger public relations gain and prestige on the
continent regardless of the capital investment required by Nigeria. Nigeria attempted to
mediate crises in Chad, between Burkina Faso and Mali, between Togo and Ghana, and
most decisively, they acted in the Liberian crises that threatened to engulf all of West
Africa.42 Reports that Gadaffi’s Libya was supporting Charles Taylor’s bid to control
Liberia, Sierra Leone and ultimately more of West Africa made Nigeria’s leadership
welcome not only among ECOWAS but in the United States as well.43
The US supported the actions of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) in Liberia, but not General Babangida, who was viewed as being supportive
of the drug trade with antidemocratic ideas.44 Buying the bulk of Nigeria's crude oil, the
United States was still Nigeria's most important trading partner.45 To relieve its
conscience about the incongruities of its love-hate relationship with Nigeria, the United
States funded prodemocracy groups and other nongovernmental organizations to get a
democratic election process moving in Nigeria.46 The United States continued to support
the actions of Babangida’s military policy in West Africa, and was dependent and
appreciative of Nigeria’s oil, but still wanted General Babangida out of office.
General Babangida enjoyed some domestic support early in his regime as
Nigerian prestige jumped on the world stage. In addition to actions in West Africa,
Nigeria played active roles in international organizations: “Joseph Garba, Nigeria's
former permanent representative to the UN, was elected in 1989 to a one-year term as
president of the UN General Assembly; Adebayo Adeedji became executive secretary of
the Economic Commission for Africa, Emeka Anyaoku became secretary general of the
Commonwealth of Nations in 1989, and former military head of state General Obasanjo
76
was internationally recognized as a world statesman and spokesman on African issues.”47
Nigeria gave military and financial aid to the African National Congress in support of its
antiapartheid policy in South Africa and provided military equipments to Mozambique to
fight South African backed rebels.48 In addition, General Babangida created a Technical
Aid Corps, similar to the United States Peace Corps, which put young Nigerian
professionals to work throughout Africa, the Caribbean, and in some Pacific countries.49
Babangida even suggested that Nigeria might again offer reduced prices to African
countries as the Middle East crises of the 1990s pushed up oil prices.50 General
Babangida’s domestic critics claimed that the external operations were personality driven
and wasteful of Nigeria’s resources. Babangida was extremely close to Liberia’s
President Samuel Doe, and some reports have Nigeria’s expenditures on Liberia at N2.8
billion. 51 Additionally, his establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, for the first
time in Nigerian history, alienated many in the powerful northern Muslim community. 52
When the 1993 elections proved to be another big disaster for northern interests the
continuation of military rule was set. The north certainly did not want President-elect
Abiola (Yoruba) running the country, and now the country no longer wanted Babangida.
The regime of General Abacha, which in 1993 ousted the interim government put
in place by a departing General Babangida, was embattled from the beginning. General
Abacha’s self-absorbed and paranoid approach to domestic concerns addressed in
chapters 3 and 4, resulted in a foreign policy that was “reactive and incoherent.”53 The
end of apartheid in 1994 removed Nigeria’s main enemy on the continent, but South
Africa continued to back the same prodemocracy movements that had hounded General
Babangida.54 The crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone were disturbing West African
77
cohesion and bleeding Nigeria heavily, but Abacha leaned on these operations as his only
positive actions on the international stage.55 While Nigeria struggled to maintain focus in
ECOWAS and the OAU, General Abacha fought an ongoing series of cross border
skirmishes with Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula. This operation and his killing of
the Ogoni chiefs resulted in Nigeria’s suspension from the Commonwealth, and ended
with Abacha seeking support from the international “pariahs” Libya, Iran, and Iraq.56
Abacha’s regime had reached the pinnacle of despotism in Nigeria. Abacha’s death in
1998 signaled the end of “lawless autocracy” in Nigeria and an interim return to the
military oligarchy of Gen Abdulsalam Abubakar. Abubakar had little time for foreign
policy decisions, as he initiated a plan to turn over to a democratically elected
government in under one year.
The Past and the Future
Throughout the Cold War, which spanned most of Nigeria’s days as an
independent country, the United States and the Soviet Union were interested in Nigeria
because of its “size, population, economic and military potential, and its oil.”57 The
global power shift of the 1990s would have less effect on Nigeria than the presidential
election of Olesgun Obasanjo in 1999. Nigeria’s economic tie to the west returned to
normalcy as its “pariah state” status vanished. Nigeria could again assert importance on
international organizations and issues, rather than purely domestic opponents. Nigeria
could strive for “economic development, African peace, and international cooperation.”58
However, Nigeria’s old organizations of influence have changed as well. While the OAU
and ECOWAS at times increase African unity, the OAU is still seeking relevancy in a
post apartheid world, and ECOWAS has been undermined by francophone Africa’s effort
78
at economic union. Libya’s M’ammar Al-Gaddafi, who is making a play to be the leader
of the African continent, is even championing a replacement organization for the OAU in
the African Union (AU).59 A weakened Nigeria must clearly develop its incredible
potential before it can lead in its old Sub-Saharan paradigm against South Africa, or
continent wide against its new rival Libya. President Obasanjo is still tied down with the
cumbersome foreign affairs bureaucracy that limited Nigeria’s first two republics, and an
increasingly fractured population has enormous opportunity to influence foreign affairs in
the information age. As fractured ethnic groups align with global transnational players
the effect on Nigerian foreign policy will be enormous.
1Joe Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991), xiv.
2The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available from
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
3Joe Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991), xii.
4The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available from
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
8The Organization of African Unity Homepage, available from http://www.oauoua.
org/, 19 March 2002.
9The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available from
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
10Richard Akinnola, Fellow Countrymen…: The Story of Coup D’etats in Nigeria
(Ikeja: Rich Consult, 2000), 21.
11Joe Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991), 4.
12Ibid.,4.
79
13Wole Soyinka, The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative on the
Nigerian Crisis (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996), 22.
14Joe Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991.,11.
15The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available
from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
16Ibid.
17Ibid.
18Ibid.
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
21The Economic Community of Western States homepage, available from
http://ecowas.int/, 19 March 2002.
22Joe Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991), x.
23Ibid., xi.
24Ibid.
25Ibid., 28.
26The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available
from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
27Joe Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering (Ibadan: Spectrum Books ltd., 1991), 29.
28Ibid.,11.
29Ibid., 159.
30Ibid., 164.
31Ibid., 163.
32Ibid., 167.
33Ibid., 171.
34The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available
from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
80
35F. Otubanjo, “Introduction: Phases and Changes in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,” in
A.B. Akinyemi, Nigeria Since Independence: the First 25 Years, vol. X: International
Relations (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1989), 6.
36Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled Giant” Nigeria since Independence
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 161.
37Ibid.
38The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available
from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
39Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled Giant” Nigeria since Independence
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 162.
40Ibid., 187.
41Ibid., 187.
42Ibid., 268.
43Ibid., 269.
44Ibid., 272.
45The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available
from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
46Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled Giant” Nigeria since Independence
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 272.
47The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available
from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
50Ibid.
51African Guardian 28 September, 1992
52Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled Giant” Nigeria since Independence
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 271.
53Ibid., 306.
54Ibid., 309.
81
55Ibid., 307.
56Ibid., 310.
57The Library of Congress Webpage, Nigeria: a country study, page available
from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html, 19 January 2002.
58Ibid.
59All Africa homepage, “OAU summit hears warnings of ‘oblivion’ if conflict
continues,” 9 July 2001, available from
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200107090390.html, 19 March 2002.
82
CHAPTER 6
THE FUTURE OF NIGERIA AND ITS ARMY
If we want to climb out of the hole we are in, it is a job for all the
people.1
Chinua Achebe
National unity fits in our American lexicon right next to patriotism, but is the
concept exportable? Alternatively, can we export the U.S. concept of a democratic nation
state to a people with a separate and distinct political tradition? These questions must be
answered in order to assist Nigeria out of her predicament. Nigeria is a nation-state that
lives in a continuous cycle of violence. This cycle of violence has historically been
semicontrolled by Nigeria’s army. In order to disengage the army from governance you
must have stability. Unfortunately for Nigeria her diverse population and ethnic religious
fault lines have been provoked to maintain insecurity on a national scale. Provoked
because ethnic groups easily maintain traditions of hate, and Nigeria’s resource scarcities
and burgeoning population discussed in chapter 1 raise the internal competition to
incredible heights. These insecurities established a tradition of political schizophrenia in
the army’s officer corps resulting in the coups discussed in chapter 2, and allowed the
economic abuses discussed in chapter 4. By modifying our frame of reference to meet
the Nigerian reality we can begin to render assistance that is truly beneficial to Nigeria in
fulfilling her destiny.
83
National Unity and Governance
In the case of national unity in Nigeria, many have asked what will be the final
price paid for unity and democracy, and to what end? Critics, such as Nobel Laureate
Wole Soyinka, have charged that the military has used the rhetoric of unity to “declare its
iron resolve to keep the nation together.”2 Moreover, once in power the same national
unity propaganda supports the right of the military government to do absolutely anything
and everything to crush protests.3 The army and its beneficiaries in the patron client
apparatus can than use soldiers to harass and control any possible opposition to prevent
national disintegration. 4 The cycle is predictable and perpetual; with scheduled elections
resulting in a measure of chaos that justifies continued military intervention to maintain
the status quo.5 Social equity and respect for the individual are not well-established
Nigerian traditions, and without them, a heterogeneous multiethnic population cannot
survive. However, the rift between the north and the south is not so severe as to be
unrecoverable. Moderate Nigerians have stated that they have more in common with
each other than they do with the military rulers and their powerful clients that maintain
the ethnic rift to prevent the development of a national conscious that will unseat them.6
This codependency reached its culmination in the regimes of Generals Babangida and
Abacha. These regimes destroyed any remaining public good will towards the army, but
also provided the impetus for a display of national unity unheard of in Nigeria.7
In the 1993 aborted elections in which Nigerians elected the “wrong candidate” in
Abiola (Yoruba), they had ultimately cast a vote for a national unity mandate that would
have to wait for General Abacha’s death in 1998 to materialize. Despite all the apparent
84
obstacles to national unity, Wole Soyinka states how Nigeria’s history and the events of
the 1993 elections led to this mandate:
A political entity that, for an appreciable period, has saluted a common
flag, adopted a common anthem, a motto, or a common pledge for ceremonial or
instructional occasions, a polity that uniformly loses its collective sense of
proportion when its football team goes to battle, fights a war or two as an entity,
flaunts a common passport. . . . I repeat, one that has, for an appreciable length of
time, managed its affairs within the context of these unifying virtues or
irrationalities-such an entity may indeed be deemed a nation by obvious status
quo.8
. . . [T]he achievement of the electoral event [of 1993] itself despite all
obstacles placed in the way of the Nigerian electorate by the dictatorship, may
enable one to understand why. . . . A candidate was defeating his opponent in that
opponent’s own base, defeating him among his own clan, his own state and
region. 9
On Nigeria’s own terms, they have proclaimed their nationhood. To say they are
not a nation or should not be in the interest of stability is to accept the continuation of
ethnic violence as an absolute truth. Ethnic chaos allowed General Abacha to deny the
1993 national mandate until his death in 1998. Ethnic chaos plays on Nigerians fears and
feeds the need for instant stability that only the army and their ruling class clients can
bring. By taking sides with any particular ethnic group or political orginization the U.S.
would foster an unnatural state in Nigeria. Despite western definitions, Nigeria must
seek her own internal stasis and model for governance.
What Type of Governance?
The key to unlocking the mystery of Nigerian governance is to define the nature
of the previous status quo and to determine a path of evolution towards stability and
prosperity that will allow the army to return to the traditional role outlined by Samuel
Huntington in his seminal work The Soldier and the State. Huntington’s military found
its cornerstone in an officer corps that possessed expertise, responsibility, and corporate
85
character.10 In Nigeria, instead of an officer corps capable of managing violence against
the national enemies, with social obligation to the nation, in which professional
achievement is based on experience, seniority, education, and ability they got a
politicized officer corps awash in corruption. Their army learned to manage violence
against the political enemies of the ruling class, without social obligation to the state,
within a system that often valued ethnic origin and political affiliation over merit.
Nigeria’s “party of power” developed within the officer corps. The Nigerian Army was
led into the trap described by Huntington: “A political officer corps, rent with faction,
subordinated to ulterior ends, lacking prestige but sensitive to the appeals of popularity,
would endanger the security of the state.”11 While Huntington was obviously more
concerned with the ability of the army to defend the nation’s sovereignty, his
condemnation applies to the destruction wrought by a military governance trend that
evolves unchecked. This trend allows increasingly flagrant abuses of power eventually
evolving into crisis epitomized by the national economic rape of General Babangida and
the complete despotism of General Abacha.
The preceding chapters have discussed the Nigerian issues that led to this
problem, some of their own making and some a result of their colonial legacy. Now the
issue must be the availability of a solution. The British left Nigeria with a democratic
tradition that was incompatible with their traditions. In their political evolution, they
have struggled from one constitutional crisis to another. For future U.S. involvement, it
is helpful to know where they are in the evolution process, and if we can be helpful or
destructive in our efforts to assist Nigeria. While on the surface the military oligarchy
86
has been replaced by a quasi-regime with the elections of 1999, the government has not
yet made the leap to a democracy that is completely representative of Nigeria’s needs.
The Structure of the Federation
Nigerians must cut bureaucracy. The system of thirty-six states evolved as a
band-aid approach to remedy ethnic sovereignty concerns under governments that could
not or would not address the real concerns of representative government. Thirty-six
separate governments mean 36 separate bureaucracies that require 90 percent of the
state’s income.12 Nigeria must return to a leaner state federation if for no other reason
than a purely economic one. The maps in figures 4 to 8 demonstrate the proliferation of
states from the four regions at independence through the twelve-state 1976 nation, the
nineteen-state 1976 nation, the thirty-state 1991 nation, to the final thirty-six state 1996
nation.
Figure 4. Four Regions, 1963. Source. Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled
Giant” Nigeria since Independence (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1998), Map.
87
Figure 5. Twelve States, 1976. Source. Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled
Giant” Nigeria since Independence (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1998), Map.
Figure 6. Nineteen States, 1976. Source. Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled
Giant” Nigeria since Independence (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1998), Map.
88
Figure 7. Thirty State, 1991. Source. Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled Giant” Nigeria
since Independence (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), Map.
Figure 8. Thirty-six State, 1996. Source. Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled Giant”
Nigeria since Independence (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), Map.
89
National Leadership
President Obasanjo was a member of the most dynamic and purposeful of the
military governments in Nigeria, and initially took some powerful steps to right the
course of the nation. He retired one hundred officers, committed the military to
professionalization with U.S. assistance and established a human rights panel to open a
national dialogue about the abuses of military rule.13 However, his economic initiatives
have been slow to follow his procedural moves, and continued ethnic violence has often
resulted in draconian military responses. The real test for President Obasanjo is the
opening of peaceful dialogue while fostering an anticorruption, selfless service personal
image. Ethno-religious tensions and instability will be the tools of choice for his
detractors to topple him, and they will instigate it with personal attacks against his
character and personal motives.
Strengthen the Institutions
The government has to get the Nigerians to accept the government institutions.
They will only do this if they feel that they are truly represented and therefore have
something to gain from the process. One suggestion is for a “constitutional conference to
allow a wide range of representatives from ethnic, religious, labor, women’s, political,
and business groups to decide how they want to live.”14 When Nigerians have a stake in
their government, the institutions of government will have real power, not coercive
power. Until Nigeria finds a system of true representative government that voices the
concerns of its various minorities, it will forever teeter in a cycle of quasi-regimes. The
only discernable difference will be in who controls the mechanisms of state repression, a
general or a civilian backed by generals.
90
Change the Political Culture
A free press is the first step in the right direction towards correcting this deficit.
Only “transparency, accountability, and national sentiment” which start with unfiltered,
uncontrolled reporting can change the public conduct of Nigeria’s elected officials.15 A
responsible free press and the readers that support it are the products of a healthy
education system. As discussed in chapter 3 the army has failed to make education a
priority. The very existence of Nigerian democracy depends on elected officials not
repeating this mistake. Free speech can be painful but it is the only way to minimize the
“winner take all” mentality of elections in Nigeria. Transparency in public life, fostered
by a free press and an educated electorate, has a fighting chance to reduce Nigeria’s
rampant corruption that continues to be a flash point for violence.
Military Reform
The current U.S. initiatives with the Nigerian military have opened the door for
professionalization, but Nigerians have a healthy distrust of U.S. motives. We must
understand their culture and history without arrogance in order to build the necessary
rapport. U.S. servicemembers training with Nigerians without cultural knowledge are
only half armed and liable to be much less effective. Joint military training with the
Nigerians has as a key component the civil-military relationship we foster while helping
them reestablish their professional pride.
Nigerian soldiers are, like the rest of the world, tuned into Western propaganda.
They know about the growing economic rift between nations. In addition, while it is not
the U.S. Army’s job to create educational and economic opportunity, it is its job to
understand the rage associated with not having them. Their army must understand the
91
concepts that make our army great. Equal opportunity, promotion by merit, and selfless
service are concepts we must convey. Even when we struggle with these concepts, we
are more successful than the Nigerians are. Independent review panels should be
established to investigate accession and promotion statistics among Nigeria’s various
ethnic groups. The army must lead the way in the social experiment of racial integration
and equality. The legitimacy of the army depends on it, it cannot provide effective
internal security until this is accomplished.
The breaking down of information barriers within the military must also be
undertaken. The various cliques, security agencies, and intelligence agencies must be
disbanded. The distrust and inefficiency they cause prevent the army from functioning at
all but the lowest tactical level. The future effectiveness of the Nigerian Army at the
operational and strategic levels requires an information revolution. In a military
government, information is power, but that old habit must be destroyed for the future
effectiveness of the army in the field where it was originally designed to function.
Taking care of the army’s veterans and easing their transition to civilian life is
another area for increased effort. The Nigerian Armed Forces Resettlement Center
(NARFC) was given a US$1 million initial investment to revamp its curriculum.16
Soldiers must have viable options for continued employment outside the military not only
to lower unemployment but also to keep this potential leadership cadre from turning to
criminal violence out of economic desperation.
Finally, the army must be permanently disengaged from economic control in
Nigeria. The patterns of economic mismanagement and abuse outlined in chapter 4
demonstrate the army’s complete inability to develop Nigeria’s economy. As long as
92
self-serving generals and retired generals from Nigeria’s past control the economy
Nigerians will suffer.
The Army and Nigeria’s Future
If these initiatives fail or are not undertaken, Nigeria will follow one of two rocky
paths away from her destiny. The more likely path will be caused by slow or incomplete
reform. In this scenario, the elected governments will be hampered by continuing
corruption and economic stagnation, the state’s legitimacy and national unity will
continue to be questioned, while the government bounces from crisis to crisis.17 A likely
outcome would be a criminal organization so imbedded in the corruption of government
and generating so much nonoil revenue from drug trafficking and other criminal activities
that it cannot be killed without killing Nigeria. Nigeria’s army will become the security
lackey to a non-state criminal organization in order to survive as an institution.
Failure to take any action on Nigeria’s core issue also leaves the door open for a
return to military rule.18 The resulting ethno-religious violence will fracture Nigeria
permanently, creating a powder keg for West Africa as minipower brokers emerge to fill
the void. This coup will closely resemble the early Gowon years, but the information
systems and media available to all sides will spiral this civil war out of central
government control. The resulting flow of refugees and completely unchecked criminal
activity will engulf West Africa.
The ultimate path Nigeria will follow is up to the Nigerians, not the United States.
We can assist them in education and economic reform and with the professionalization of
their military. Some people outside the military will clamor that only military rule can
hold Nigeria together. Watch out for these individuals, as they are dangerous, misguided,
93
and probably have a vested economic interest. All Nigerians must decide if they have
more to gain from unity and the compromise involved in ensuring that minority interests
are represented. Nigerians could learn from the American experiment with a
heterogeneous population. Our civil rights struggles pale in comparison to the violence
of Nigeria’s ethnic struggles. They must develop their own unique brand of
representative democracy, and educate a population to understand community interest
and rule of law with an army as tool of communal interest. As long as authority is based
in violence, Nigerians will continue to kill each other in large numbers and fight for
control of the army to subjugate other ethnic groups to their will.
1Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria (New York: Public
Affairs Press, 2000), 289.
2Wole Soyinka, The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative on the
Nigerian Crisis (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996), 33.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 34.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., 7.
7Ibid., 9.
8Ibid., 23.
9Ibid., 39.
10Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1957,2001) 11-18.
11Ibid., 464.
12Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria (New York: Public
Affairs Press, 2000), 299.
94
13Karl Maier, This house has fallen: Midnight in Nigeria (New York: Public
Affairs Press, 2000), 294.
14Ibid., 295.
15Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Crippled Giant” Nigeria since Independence
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 318.
16Jim Fisher-Thompson, US Department of State International Information
Programs, Nigerian Army Minister Wants U.S. Aid to Nigerian Veterans Expanded,
available from, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/security/a1121002.htm, April 13, 2002.
17Karl Maier, This house has fallen: Midnight in Nigeria (New York: Public
Affairs Press, 2000), 300.
18Ibid., 301.
95
APPENDIX
NIGERIAN SOLDIERS INVOLVEMENT IN COUPS D'ÉTAT, 1960-1990
(LEADERS, JAILED, KILLED, EXECUTED)
1966 (January) coup d'état leaders
Major Kaduna Nzeogwu
Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna
Major C. I. Anuforo
Major T. Onwatuegu
Major Adewale Ademoyega
Major D. Okafor
Major I. H. Chukwuka
Captain E. N. Nwobosi
Captain G. Ude
Captain Gbuhe
Captain G. O. Oji
Lieutenant Ogunchi
2nd Lieutenant N. S. Wokocha
Killed during the 1996 (January) coup d'état
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Prime Minister)
Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh (Minister of Finance)
Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola (Premier Western Region)
Sir Ahmadu Bello (Premier, Northern Region)
Brigadier Sam Ademulegun
Brigadier Zakarriya Maimalari
Colonel R. A. Shodeinde
Lietenant Colonel Chinyelu Umegbe
Colonel Kur Mohammed
Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Paur
Major Samuel Adegoke
1966 (July) Counter coup d'état leaders
Lietenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon
Major T. Y. Danjuma
Captain Ibrahim Babangida
96
Killed during the 1996 (July) Counter coup d'état
Major General J. T. Aguiyi-Ironsi
Lietenant Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi
Lietenant Colonel I. C. Okoro
Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Okonwye
Major Theophilus Nzegwu
Major Bernard Nnamani
Major O. U. Isong
Major Victor Ogunro
Major Peter Obi
Major Alister Drummond
Major Ibanga Ekanem
Major John Obienu
Major Chukwueike Emelifionwu
1975 coup d'état leaders
Colonel Joseph Garba
Colonel Ibrahim Babangida (*1966 Counter Coup)
Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo
Colonel Abdulahi Mohammed
Lietenant Colonel Shehu Yar’adua
(*1975 dubbed the bloodless coup d'état. No casualties)
1976 abortive coup d'état leaders
Major General I. D. Bisalla
Lieutenant Colonel Buka Dimka
Killed during the 1976 abortive coup d'état
General Murtala Mohammed (Head of State)
Lieutenant Akintunde Akinsehinwa (Aide to the Head of State)
Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo (Governor of Kwara State)
Publicly executed for involvement in the 1976 abortive coup d'état:
Major General I. D. Bisalla
Colonel Isa Bakar
Colonel A. D. S. Way
Lieutenant Colonal Buka Dimka
Lieutenant Colonel A. R. Aliyu
Lieutenant Colonel Ayuba Tense
97
Lieutenant Colonel K. Adamu
Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Umaru
Major K. Gagara
Major Kola Afolabi
Major C. B. Dabang
Major J. W. Kasai
Major M. M. Mshellia
Major Ola Ogunmekan
Captain G. Parrwang
Captain J. Idi Fadah
Captain S. Walias
Captain A. A. Aliyu
Captain A. Dawurang
Captain M. R. Gotip
Lieutenant Mohammed
Lieutenant L. K. Seleng
Lieutenant Wiliam Seri
Lieutenant Peter Cigari
Lieutenant O. Zagni
Lieutenant S. Wayah
Lieutenant Sabo Kwale
Warrant Officer Monday Manchony
Warrant Officer Sambo Pankshin
Warrant Officer Dakup Seri
Warrant Officer Bawa
Sergeant Richard Dungdang
Sergeant Sale Pankshin
Sergeant Bala Javan
Sergeant Ahmadu Reye
Police Commissioner Joseph Gomwalk
Police Sergeant Shaiyen
Mr. Abdul Karim Zakari
Jailed for involvement in the 1976 abortive coup d'état
Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Madugu
Major A. K. Abang
Captain C. Wuyep
Captain A. A. Maidobo
Captain Isaiah Gowon
2nd Lieutenant A. Walbe
Warrant Officer E. Izah
Sergeant J. Bupwada
Mr. S. K. Dimka (Former Assistant Police Commissioner)
Mrs. Helen Gomwalk
98
Mr. J. Tuwe
Mr. S. Anyadofu
Mr. D. Gontu (police officer)
Mr. Gyang Pam (police officer)
1983 coup d'état leaders
Brigadier Mohammed Buhari
Brigadier Sani Abacha
Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon
Brigadier Ibrahim Babangida (*1966 Counter Coup / 1975 Coup)
Brigadier Ibrahim Bako
Major Abubakar Umar
Major Abdulmumuni Aminu
Major Lawan Gwadabe
Killed during the 1983 coup d'état
Brigadier Ibrahim Bako
1985 coup d'état Leaders
General Ibrahim Babangida (*1966 Counter Coup / 1975 Coup / 1983
Coup)
General Sani Abacha
Brigadier Joshua Dongoyaro
Colonel Ahmed Abdulahi
Lieutenant Colonel Tanko Ayuba
Major Abubakar Umar
Major Abdulmumuni Aminu
Major Lawan Gwadabe
(*1985 another bloodless coup d'état. A Removal of General Buhari
by the officers that had assisted in his 1983 coup d'état)
1986 abortive coup d'état leaders
Major General Mamman Vasta
Wing Commander Ben Ekele
Wing Commander Adamu Sakaba
Squadron Leader Martin Luther
Squadron Leader A. Ahura
99
Publicly executed for involvement in the 1986 abortive coup d'état
Major General Mamman Vasta
Wing Commander Ben Ekele
Wing Commander Adamu Sakaba
Squadron Leader Martin Luther
Squadron Leader A. Ahura
Lieutenant Colonel Mike Iyorche
Lieutenant Colonel Musa Bitiyong
Commander Achukwu Ogwiji
Major David Bamidele
Jailed for involvement in the 1986 abortive coup d'état
Squadron Leader Gabriel Ode
Wing Commander J.B. Uku
Lieutenant Colonel K.G. Dakpa
Major Moses Effiong
Major D. E. West
Major T. Akwashiki
Major J. O. Onyeke
Captain C.I.L.
Lieutenant Peter Odoba
Brigadier Nassarawa (2 years and forced retirement)
1990 abortive coup d'état Leaders
Lieutenant Colonel Tony Nyam
Major Gideon Orkar
Major S. Mukoro
Killed during the 1990 coup d'état
Colonel U. K. Bello (ADC President Ibrahim Babangida)
Undetermined number of soldiers from the presidential security detail
Publicly executed for involvement in the 1990 abortive coup d'état:
Major Gideon Orkar
Captain N. H. Empere
Captain P. A. Dakolo
Lieutenant A. E. Akogun
Lieutenant Nicholas Odey
Lieutenant C. O. Ozoalor
Second Lieutenant A. B. Umukoro
100
Second Lieutenant E. J. Ejesku
Second Lieutenat Emmanuel Ade-Alade
Warrant Officer Monday Bayefa
Warrant Officer Godwin Donko
Warrant Officer Afolabi Moses
Warrant Officer Jonathan Ekimi
Fifty-three additional soldiers from staff sergeant to private were also
publicly executed for involvement in the 1990 abortive coup d'état.
Jailed for involvement in the 1990 abortive coup d'état
Warrant Officer David Mukoro
Warrant Officer Jomo James
Warrant Officer Samson Elo
Twenty-nine additional soldiers from staff sergeant to private were also
jailed for involvement in the 1990 abortive coup d'état.
101
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105
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The Nigerian Armed Forces are the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The military has active duty personnel in three armed services, totaling approximately 85,000 troops and 82,000 paramilitary personnel.^[2] Its origins lie in the elements of the Royal West African Frontier Force that became Nigerian when independence was granted in 1960. In 1956 the Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces, RWAFF, and in April 1958 the colonial government of Nigeria took over from the British War Office control of the Nigerian Military Forces.^[3]
Since its creation the Nigerian military has fought in a civil war – the conflict with Biafra in 1967-70 – and sent peacekeeping forces abroad both with the United Nations and as the backbone of the ECOWAS-sponsored ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It has also seized power twice at home (1966 & 1983) and today ‘has become entrenched in all facets of [Nigerian] civic and economic life,’ including manipulation of national political life – General Sani Abacha’s creation of artificial political parties – and a central role in the control and management of Nigeria’s oil wealth.^[4]
In the aftermath of the civil war, the much expanded size of the military, around 250,000 in 1977, consumed a large part of Nigeria’s resources under military rule for little productive return. The great expansion of the military during the civil war further entrenched the existing military hold on Nigerian society carried over from the first military regime. In doing so, it played an appreciable part in reinforcing the military’s nearly first-among-equals status within Nigerian society, and the linked decline in military effectiveness. Olusegun Obasanjo, who by 1999 had become President, bemoaned the fact in his inaugural address that year: ‘..Professionalism has been lost. ..my heart bleeds to see the degradation in the proficiency of the military.’^[5]
Nigeria sends many of its officers to Pakistan for training. Particularly, to institutions such as the Pakistan Military Academy, Command and Staff College in Quetta and to the National Defence University, Islamabad. Training establishments in Nigeria include the initial officer entry Nigerian Defence Academy at Kaduna, the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, where a new simulation centre is being established ([1]), and the National War College at Abuja ([2]). The U.S. commercial military contractor Military Professional Resources Inc. has been involved from around 1999-2000 in advising on civil-military relations for the armed forces, including operating the simulation centre at the AFCSC.^[6]

Brief Notes On Nigeria

� Leaders of Nigeria    �� Country Profile Federal Capital: Abuja � Business Hours: Area: 923,768,64 Sq. Km Banks: 8 a.m. - 3 p.m. Monday only Population: 110 Million              8 a.m. - 1.30 p.m. Tues. - Fri. Principal Rivers: Niger and Benue   Independence Day: October 1 � Federal Government Offices: Remembrance Day: January 15 7.30 a.m. - 3.30 p.m. Mon. - Fri. Currency: Naira = 100 Kobo   Time: GMT + 1 EST + 6 � Commercial Offices: Climate: Humid Sub-Tropical 8.00 a.m. - 5.00 p.m. Mon. - Fri. Weights and Measures: Metric   Legal and Tax: British Oriented � International Airports: VAT: 5% (Introduced Jan. 1994) Lagos: Murtal Muhammed Airport Dailing Codes: - in code (Outside)234 Abuja: Nnamdi Azikiwe Intl.Airport Dailing Code: - out code 009 Port Harcourt: Port Harcourt Intl. Airport   Kano: Kano International Airport

Summary:

1862 (January 1): Lagos Island annexed as a colony of Britain Mr. H.S Freeman became Governor of Lagos Colony (Jan. 22) 1893: Oil Rivers Protectorate renamed Niger Coast Protectorate with Calabar as capital. 1890's: British reporter Flora Shaw, who later married Lord Frederick Lugard, suggests that the country be named "Nigeria" after the Niger River. 1897: The British overthrew Oba Ovonramwen of Benin, one of the last independent West African kings. 1900: The Niger Coast Protectorate, merged with the colony and protectorate of Lagos, was renamed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria Sir Lord Fredrick Lugard 1914: The northern and southern protectorates were amalgamated to form Nigeria. Colonial officer Frederick Lugard was governor-general. 1929 (October): Women in the eastern commercial city of Aba held a rowdy but effective and victorious protest against high taxes and low prices of Nigerian exports. 1951: The British decided to grant Nigeria internal self-rule, following an agitation led by the NCNC, Dr Azikiwe’s political party. 1954: The position of Governor was created in the three regions (North, West and East) on the adoption of federalism. 1958: Nigerian Armed Forces transferred to Federal control. The Nigerian Navy was born. 1959: The new Nigerian currency, the Pound, was introduced 1959: Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and Niger Delta Congress (NDC) formed an alliance to contest parliamentary elections. 1960 (October 1): Independence. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe became Nigeria’s first indigenous Governor General. 1960-1966: First Republic of Nigeria under a British parliamentary system. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was elected Prime Minister. 1960: Nigeria's joined with Liberia and Togo in the "Monrovia Group", seeking some form of a confederation of African states. 1961 (February 11 and 12): After a plebiscite, the Northern Cameroon, which before then was administered separately within Nigeria, voted to join Nigeria. But Southern Cameroon became part of francophone Cameroon. 1961 (June 1): Northern Cameroon became Sardauna Province of Nigeria, the thirteenth province of Northern Nigeria as the country’s map assumed a new shape. 1961 (October 1): Southern Cameroon ceased to be a part of Nigeria. 1962:Following a split in the leadership of the AG that led to a crisis in the Western Region, a state of emergency was declared in the region, and the federal government invoked its emergency powers to administer the region directly. Consequently the AG was toppled as regional power. Awolowo, its leader, and other AG leaders, were convicted of treasonable felony. Awolowo's former deputy and premier of the Western Region formed a new party--the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)--that took over the government. Meanwhile, the federal coalition government acted on the agitation of minority non-Yoruba groups for a separate state to be excised from the Western Region 1963: Nigeria shed the bulk of its political affinity with the British colonial power to become a Republic. Nnamdi Azikiwe became the first President. Obafemi Awolowo leader of the Action Group (AG) became leader of the opposition. The regional premiers were Ahmadu Bello (Northern Region, NPC), Samuel Akintola (Western Region, AG), Michael Okpara (Eastern Region, NCNC). Dennis Osadebey (NCNC) became premier of the Midwestern Region just created out of the old Western region. 1964: Prime Minister Balewa’s Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) aligned with a faction of the Action Group (AG) led by Chief Ladoke Akintola, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) in readiness for the elections. At the same time, the main Action Group led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo formed an alliance with the United Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC) and Alhaji Aminu Kano's Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and Borno Youth Movement to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). 1965 (November): Violence erupted in the western region, and criticism of the political ruling class created unease in the new republic. 1966 (January 15): Junior officers of the Nigerian army, mostly majors overthrew the government in a coup d’etat. The officers, most of whom were Igbo, assassinated Balewa in Lagos, Akintola in Ibadan, and Bello in Kaduna, as well as some senior northern officers. The coup leaders pledged to establish a strong and efficient government committed to a progressive program and eventually to new elections. They vowed to stop the post-electoral violence and stamp out corruption that they said was rife in the civilian administration. General Johnson T. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the most senior military officer, and incidentally an easterner (Igbo), who stepped in to restore order, became the head of state. 1966 (May 29): Massive rioting started in the major towns of Northern Nigeria and attack the Igbos and other easterners to avenge the death of many senior northerners in the coup. 1966 (July 29): A group of Northern officers and men stormed the Western Region’s governor’s residence in Ibadan where General Aguiyi Ironsi was staying with his host, Lt. Col Adekunle Fajuyi. Both the head of state and governor are killed. 1966 (August 1): Lt. Col Yakubu Gowon a fairly junior officer from the north became the new head of state. 1967 (January 4): Nigeria's military leaders travelled to Aburi in Ghana to find a solution to problems facing the country and to avert an imminent military clash between the north and the east. 1967 (May 30): Lt Col Ojukwu, governor of the east, declared his region the Republic of Biafra. 1967 (July 6): First shots were fired heralding a 30-month war between the Federal government and the rebel Republic of Biafra. 1970 (January 15): The civil war ended and reconstruction and rehabilitation begin. 1971 (April 2): Nigeria switches with amazing smoothness from driving on the left hand side (like Britain) to the left, like all its neighbouring countries. 1973 (May): Gowon establishes the National Youth Service Corps Scheme and introduces compulsory one-year service for all university graduates, to promote integration and peace after the war. 1974: General Gowon said he could not keep his earlier promise to return power to a democratically elected government in 1976. He announced an indefinite postponement of a programme of transition to civil rule. 1975 (October): Gowon was overthrown in a coup, on the anniversary of his ninth year in office. Brigadier (later General) Murtala Mohammed, the new head of state promised a 1979 restoration of democracy. 1976: The federal government adhering to the recommendations of a panel earlier set up to advise it, approves the creation of a new Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, away from Lagos. 1976 (February 13): Murtala Mohammed was killed in the traffic on his way to work. But the coup executed by an easy-going physical education corps Lt colonel, and heralded by a quixotic announcement on the radio, was botched. 1976 (February 14): General Mohammed is succeeded by General Olusegun Obasanjo who pledged to pursue his predecessor’s transition programme. 1976 (September 2): The Universal Primary Education Scheme (UPE) was introduced, making education free and compulsory in the country. 1977: Nigeria hosted FESTAC the festival of arts and culture drawing black talent and civilization from around the world. 1979: Nigeria got a new constitution. 1979 (October 1): General Obasanjo handed over to Alhaji Shehu Shagari as first elected executive President and the first politician to govern Nigeria since 1966. Five parties had competed for the presidency, and Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was declared the winner. The other parties were: Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), National People’s Party (UPN), Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP), People’s Redemption Party (PRP) 1983: The conduct of the general elections was criticised by opposing parties and the media. Violent erupted in some parts of the west. 1983(September): Shagari was re-elected president of Nigeria in August-September 1983. 1983(December 31): Following a coup d’etat, the military returned to power.  Major-General Muhammadu Buhari was named head of state. 1985 (August 27): Following accusations of callousness and overzealousness, Buhari was overthrown in a palace coup. The army chief, General Ibrahim Babangida took over power. 1986:  The seat of government was officially moved from Lagos to Abuja 1993 (June 12): After several postponements by the military administration, presidential elections were held. Businessman and newspaper publisher Moshood Abiola of the SDP took unexpected lead in early returns. 1993 (June 23): Babangida on national television offered his reasons for annulling the results of the Presidential election. At least 100 people were killed in riots in the southwest, Abiola's home area. 1993 (August 26): Under severe opposition and pressure, Babangida resigned as military president and appointed an interim government headed by Chief Ernest A. Shonekan. 1993 (October): A ragtag group of young people under the name of Movement for the Advancement of Democracy  (MAD) hijacked a Nigerian airliner to neighbouring Niger in order to protest official corruption. Nigerian troops stormed liberated the plane at the N’djamena airport, Republic of Niger. 1993 (November 17): General Sani Abacha, defence minister in the interim government and most senior officer, seized power from Shonekan, abolishes the constitution. 1994: Abiola, who had escaped abroad after the annulment, returned and proclaimed himself president. He was arrested and charged with treason. 1995 (July): Former head of state, Obasanjo was sentenced to 25 years in prison by a secret military tribunal for alleged participation in an attempt (widely believed to have been fictional) to overthrow the government.  1996 (May): Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria's first president, died. 1998 (June 8): General Abacha died suddenly and mysteriously. The official cause of death: heart attack. Nigerians swarmed the streets rejoicing. 1998 (June 9): Gen. Abdulsalaam Abubakar was named Nigeria's eighth military ruler. He promised to restore civilian rule promptly. 1998: A month after General Abacha's death the United Nations General-Secretary Kofi Annan arrived in Nigeria to conclude deals for the release of Chief Abiola. 1998 (July 7): Abiola died in detention of a heart disease, a week after Annan’s visit, before he could be released in a general amnesty for political prisoners. Rioting in Lagos led to over 60 deaths. 1998 (July 20): Abubakar promised to relinquish power on May 29, 1999. 1999 (February 15): Former military ruler Obasanjo won the presidential nomination of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).  1999 (May): A new Constitution was adopted. It was based on the 1979 Constitution. 1999 (May 29): Former Military Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo, was sworn in as Nigeria's democratically elected civilian President. [Nigeria Frontial NAvy. think Merchant Navy or Marine Navy will "CHECKMATE THEM ON THE CRIEM THEY COMMIT" that is why they will fight them till christ come.REFORMATION OF NIGERIAN MERCHANT NAVY SEAFARER AND EMERGING NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (THE SOLUTION TO NIGER DELTA CRISIS AND NIGERIA AT LARGE) The Nigerian Merchant Navy Seafarers (Maritime, petroleum security and safety corps) has been takings as responsibility to secure maritime, petroleum organization and contribute to the maintenance of external and external aggression. It further implies that the Nigerian Merchant Navy Corps (NMN) would assist the government to uphold its authority and protect national economic resources Brief History Of Nigerian Merchant Navy (NMN )And Nigeria Navy (NN) In Nigeria, the navy was created in 1958 from the defunct Nigerian Marine Department originally formed in 1914 after the merger of the northern and southern Nigerian marine detachment (merchant navy).the northern and southern marine detachment originated from the British mercantile marine- the armed merchant ships of British shipping and trading companies of the nineteenth century, which in collaboration with royal navy, help to colonize Nigeria. In 1922 king George v changed the name of the British Merchant service to Merchant Navy in recognition of its role in World War 1. Nigeria Navy was formed because of the attack the merchant navy face on the high sea and due bad experience facing Nigeria Merchant Navy at the sea called SEA LOBBER because Merchant Navy are not armed, equipped and trained as Nigeria Navy to face the attack. The British Government now carved out Nigeria navy from Nigerian Merchant navy to be trained as a sea soldier in 1956 eleven small boat and harbour craft and about 200 officers and men were transferred from the then defunct (Nigerian Merchant Navy) to become independent naval defence force. In 1958 the British parliament formally reconstituted the colony Small Naval Defence force as the royal Nigeria Navy. The term royal was dropped when Nigeria became a Republic and negligence of Nigerian Merchant Navy ,Nigeria navy took over all their duty which made them useless and jobless . Now they are clamoring for independent to be set free by national assembly in which it will provide thousand of jobs for unemployed youth in Nigeria . It is hard to believe that that Nigerian merchant navy gave birth to Nigeria navy it is only know by few people in Nigeria even history and records will tells and if Ghana ,United State of America, Canada, South Africa, Australia, Venezuela (caracas), Chile, Denmark, Mexico, united kingdom e.t.c Nigeria should not be left out . . WHO IS A MERCHANT NAVY ? A country commercial ships and people who work on them, who were trained to serve on land or sea. A nations merchant fleet comprise the ship that is used to transport cargo during times of peace and war. . Ship transport is used for a variety of unpackaged raw materials ranging from chemical, petroleum product and bulk cargo such as coal ,iron-ore, cereal, bauxite and others. It is therefore unfortunate, that because of greed for accumulating of wealth from the merchant Navy Auxilliary, Nigerian Merchant Navy left partly of their duties on-done after the establishment of the Nigeria Navy (NN) in 1956 and flee to sea, which is their LIFE and HERITAGE, leaving the marine policing duties undone, which created a lot of sea security lapses for instance, if there was separation of power checks and balances between the Nigerian Merchant NAVY(NMN) and Armies of the naval profession each formation would seat up with is assigned duties properly. AIMS, GOAL AND OBJECTIVES OF NIGERIAN MERCHANT NAVY CORPS. However, the above security challenges can be overcome if some of these preventive strategies are put in place. These preventive measures includes surveillance, patrol or presence of security personnel in oil and economic installation, patrol vessel especially for deep offshore and onshore patrols of swampy mangroves, creek and sea difficult terrain in Niger Delta region have been unable to penetrate. The Nigerian Merchant Navy and Security Corps shall perform these following functions: The duty of the Nigerian Merchant Navy Seafarers Maritime & Petroleum Security Corps is to protect and ensure the safety of coastline, the territorial waters, internal seaports of the country, to use the powers and authority of the Merchant Navy at seas where they have the sovereignty pursuant to the rules of national and international sovereignty; to peruse and prevent smuggling through the sea way. To ensure the security at sea during fires exercise by the land, marine and air forces. To perform search and salvation duties at sea in accordance with rules of international search and salvation convention. To monitor and check the working of the Navigation aids of the sea barrier placed by the authorities of the wreck sign. To pursuit and prevention of acts against the laws on prevention of smuggling , forbidden military zones and security zones, protection of cultural and national possession cabotage, life and property safety at sea with arresting and suing the offenders initiating the legal proceeding; delivering the arrested persons and the means of offences to the court of law. (A)Assist in the restoration of peace in the Niger Delta regions. (B)Clearing of the channel way for waterways for local pilot operations. (C)Making peace and conflict resolution with millitant youths in the Niger Delta Regions and Nigeria at large. (E)Provision of security at major oil terminals e.g NNPC,SPDC E.T.C. (F)To monitor and stop the pollution of Nigeria territorrials waters during ship building in docks and ship ways and during the construction of marines facilities. (G)To protect the territorial water from contaminated poisonous, chemicals or element that are liable to constitute risk to both human and animals lives. (H) Combat crimes and disasters in the seaports, onboard ship, terminals, jetties, coast and creek, waterways in the Nigeria territorial water. (I)To perform search and salvation duties at sea in accordance with rules of international search and salvation convention. (J)To monitor and check the working Navigation aids, of the sea barrier placed by the authorities of the wreck sign. Etc and to inform any malfunction or missing to the competent department of Merchant Navy. (K) The pursuit and prevention of acts against the laws on prevention of smuggling, forbidden military zones and security zones, territorial waters, ancient remains, protection of cultural and national possessions cabotage,life and property safety at sea, custom, radio communication Nigeria flag, encouragement of travel industry, public hygiene and environment, with arresting and suing the offenders, initiating the legal proceeding : delivering the arrested persons the means of offences to the court of law. (L)The Nigerian Merchant Navy Corps will also assist the general security forces in pursuit and prevention of terrorist or similar activities which begin on land and continue at sea to detect and report any violation committed in the territorial waters or airspace of the country. (M)The Nigerian Merchant Navy Corps also ensures the security at sea during fires exercise by the land, marine and air force. ANALYSIS OF SEA SECURITY LAPSES IN NIGERIA (1)Oil pollution has affected Niger Delta waters which made the Youth jobless and useless them to the society because most them were fishermen or farmer which increased unemployed youth and turn them to hungry lions. According to the former Minister of Labour DR HASSAN LAWAL. Said, there are 5,000 vessel operating in Nigeria seas . We have a duty to ensure that our youths are employed as seafarers- Vanguard Newspaper OCT,25,2007 Pg 33. (2)Anti-illegal importation of sophisticated weapon (Ammunition) through sea, this is as a result of sea security lapses in our country. (3)Stowaway (illegal Migrant by sea) In Niger Delta the (Joint Task Force) made known to Nigerian that there are machineries migrating into the country to take the Niger Delta militants of about 300 fighters around OLUGBOBIRI Area in Southern Ijaw Local Govt of Balyesa in weapon handling, definitely this machineries migrate through sea, and these are people of criminal intention. (4)Anti-illegal Bunkering: illegal bunkering includes vandalization oil pipelines with criminal intent for either mischief or for monetary gains. It also includes diversion of crude and refined oil product to unknown destination. (5)Anti-Smuggling Operations: In her anti-smuggling operation the organization will assist in the enforcement of customs laws. (6)Anti-Piracy Operations: This is to confront and combat the activities of armed robbers or bandits along water ways. (7)Anti-illegal fishery: The organization will be assisting in the enforcement of customs laws in anti-fishery operations. (8)Civil responsibilities: Participation in internal security operation to aid civil authorities and to participate in restoration of peace and resolution of conflict between oil companies and host communities. BENEFITS OF NIGERIAN MERCHANT NAVY CORPS (MARITIME & PETROLEUM SECURITY AND SAFETY CORPS) TO THE ECONOMY. If the BILL is enacted into Law, the economy stands to benefit thus: (1)It will drastically reduces unemployment rates, poverty, political violence, social instability, environmental degradation and pollution, cyber fraud(yahoo-yahoo), bunkers, kidnapping,yahoo-yahoo, abduction of Nigeria citizen and foreigners, prostitution ,poor outcomes of development weak institutional arrangement (UNEMPLOYMENT:AN IMPEDIMENT TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT). (2)It brings stability to the economy and conducive environment for foreign investor in MARITIME and OIL SECTORS. (3)It reduces money spent on repair of pipeline vandalization and extra billion spent annually in the upstream and downstream. Note: ANY DISCRUPTION TO CRUDE OIL AND LNG EXPORT BUSSINESS IN THE ISLAND COULD COST NIGERIA ABOUT 1 BILLION DOLLARS MONTHLY ; BY ALEX OKUMO (The business Nigeria investigative journal 2-8 June 2008 pg 19. (4)Providing 24 hours security measures at Niger Delta Nigeria at large. (5)Finally if enacted the NIGERIAN MERCHANT NAVY CORPS into law, it would boost the image of the country and enhance Nigeria chances for a seat in the UNITED NATION SECURITY COUNCIL. In other to compliment the effort of the HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT AIHAJI UMARU MUSA YARADUA and the newly created NIGER DELTA MINISTRY AND NIGERIAN at large, it is therefore necessary for the total REFORMATION of NIGERIAN MERCHANT NAVY CORPS to meet up with President seven point Agenda and to ensure in consolidating and enhance lasting solution to the dreadful crisis in the NIGER DELTA REGIONS. TRAINING OF NIGERIA MARCHANT NAVY FOR WAR According to RUDYARD KIPLING: Maritime nations the world recognized the vital role, the merchant marine plays in the Maritime strategy in peace and in war. Merchant ship are regards as the “FOURTH ARMS” of defenses ( after ARMY,NAVY AND AIR-FORCE), force multiplier or the centre -piece of logistic train for any war at sea. A merchant ship stands as good chance as a warship of being hit by a missile, a mine or torpedo. Proper naval training becomes essential for merchant men to imbibe them courage, spirit of heroism, deep sense of patriotism and national honor. Different nation follow different patterns in the training of Navies. This training philosophy is a sound one in view of what has been said about the roles of merchant ships in war. It is the ways to groom and would seat up with is assigned duties properly pattern in the training of men of their merchant navies. Military training for merchant naval men removes any clumsiness or lack of proper orientation they might suffer in the course of their participation in war at sea. Merchant Navy of yesterday are coward, not trained, unskilled which makes sea piracy hold them to ransomed and Kidnapping of oil workers, it is high time for the presidency and national assembly to empower NIGERIAN MERCHANT NAVY SEAFARERS (MARITIME, PETROLEUM SECURITY AND SAFETY CORPS) for the sustainable of maritime, petroleum environment in NIGERIA. Many things still needed to put in place in Maritime Sectors as the nation’s economic life and coming together of Maritime stake holder to support the laudable project but Nigerian Merchant Navy Corps (Maritime& petroleum security and safety corps) to put the mistakes in order with the help and support of (INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANISATION ) I.M.O , INTERNATIONAL SHIPS AND PORTS FACILITIES SECURITY (ISPS) and INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS FEDERATION (I.T.W.F) NIGERIAN MERCHANT NAVY SEAFARER(MARINE NAVY) COAST GUARD AND NIGERIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATIVE SAFETY AGENCY( NIMASA) Have a duty to perform in ensuring development and the growth of sectors in Nigeria , as maritime industry is the main of economy. Let joins hand to together by promoting maritime sectors and meeting up with challenges ahead by achieving vision 2020.Let us embrace peace and unity to move this Nation forward , We can re-brand this Nation without inviting foreign expert we are expert by ourselves as a MARINE NAVY (COAST GUARD). According to Senate House Leader, Senator Teslim Kola Folarin As a Guest Columnist in THISDAY Newspaper in Resolving the Niger Delta Crisis : Federal government will need to review some of our laws to enhance communal autonomy and make the communities stakeholders in the exploitation of the resources in their localities . This is a law that will unleash the energies of communities to protect and work for the successful exploitation of resources in their domains. The survival of Niger Delta is a sine qua non to the survival of Nigeria as a Nation. THISDAY PAPER JULY 4, 2008 PG 64. Your Excellency sir, The Nigerian Merchant Navy Seafarers are fully prepared to create jobs Opportunities for over Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand (250,000) for Nigerian citizen, youth nationwide in the maritime and Petroleum industries . Also fully prepared to protect and safeguard the nation resources from the hand of saboteurs. We are soliciting for great assistant from the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in accordance to put in place in Nigeria more laws to solidify the Establishment of the NIGERIAN MERCHANT NAVY BILL as an organize authority under the Federal government. Thus it becomes an operational body of itself under humble leadership of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In conclusive, the Nigerian Merchant Navy Corps craves the indulgences and would appreciate people willingness to support and speak on our behalf in view of her BILL currently on the table of the SENATE and also help us to advice the NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NASS) to kindly reason with us to our request.

<sup>HISTORY, ROLES AND ORGANIZATION
OF THE NIGERIAN NAVY
INTRODUCTION
1. One of the primary responsibilities of a nation and indeed her
government is the protection of national interests both at home and
abroad. According to a school of thought on international relations, the
tripod upon which national interests are founded are national security,
economic well-being and international prestige. From this perspective,
the overriding national interest of any nation can be concretely
interpreted as preservation of territorial integrity and national values.
Obviously, for littoral nations such as Nigeria, the protection of her
maritime front and related activities by a capable naval force is an
imperative. In supporting this assertion historically, General Hithles of
the United States Marine Corps said, ‘the pathway of man's journey
through the ages is littered with the wreckage of nations which, in their
hours of glory, forgot their dependence on the sea.’
2. Nations with maritime interests which aspire to exert their
influence outside their own boundaries must be able to bring power to
bear at sea. According to the doctrine of Sea Power, ‘any nation which
derives benefits from the sea cannot turn its back on the sea’. It,
therefore, follows that any nation whose territory borders the sea, and
whose economy is supported largely from the sea, must logically need
the sea for at least 4 purposes. These are:
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a. Passage of goods and people, that is sustenance of
commercial activities
b. Passage of military forces, for diplomatic purposes and in
the event of war, as a base for engaging the adversary’s land, air
and sea targets.
c. Exploration and exploitation of resources in or under the
sea.
d. Preventing hostile military access to its territory.
3. Nigeria’s location at the corner of Africa in the Gulf of Guinea,
within the South Atlantic Ocean, is very strategic. Her sea frontier
extends from Long 002o 49’ E to Long 008o 30’E, with a coastline of 420
nm. As a maritime nation, she needs the sea for the 4 purposes earlier
enumerated. In addition, her dependence on the sea and other
maritime interests need to be secured against any threats be they
external or internal; political, economic or military. It was for these
reasons that some Nigerian nationalists, prior to independence,
perceived the need for a full-fledged navy with the capabilities and
relevant organizational structure to ward off any attempt to undermine
the nation’s security, territorial integrity and maritime interests. Chief A
Rosiji, a member of the erstwhile Nigerian Parliament, during the 1955
debate on the need for a navy, stated that, ‘One of the functions of the
navy will be the naval defence of Nigeria within its territorial waters…….
I would like it to be extended beyond our own territorial waters’. The
Nigerian Navy (NN) of today is the navy which emerged from those
debates, even though it has evolved greatly overtime. This paper would
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consider the history of the NN before enumerating the roles of the NN.
It will finally highlight the organization of the NN.
AIM
4. The aim of this presentation is to acquaint the students of Senior
Course 32 with the history, roles and organization of the NN.
HISTORY OF THE NIGERIAN NAVY
5. The history of the NN cannot be discussed without recourse to the
colonial era. What is today known as the NN is an offshoot of the
colonial Nigerian Marine Department of the Royal Navy (RN), which was
established to further the interest of the British in the West African
subregion. The functions of the Nigerian Marines at that time included:
a. Port security and examinations.
b. Provision of security for RN ships on patrol duties to and
within Nigeria.
c. Ferry services.
d. Pilotage duties.
e. Servicing of buoys and lighthouses.
6. These duties obviously did not impress the nationalists who
desired a navy capable of ruling the waves just like the RN. The
agitation for the establishment of a navy was succinctly summarized in
the words of Mr LL Olakunle, a Member of Parliament in 1956. He said,
‘If we must have a Nigerian Navy, then we must have something along
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the pattern of the British Navy’. With further pressure from the
nationalists, the colonial administration disbanded the colonial Marine
Department. Sequel to this action, 250 officers and men of the
disbanded Marine Department were put together to form the nucleus of
the Nigerian Naval Force (NNF) in April 1956. The force was later
renamed Naval Defence Force (NDF) of Nigeria.
7. On 1 June 1956, the NDF commenced operation with 11
assorted ships and craft inherited from the erstwhile colonial Marine
Department of the RN. On 1 May 1958, the NDF was legally
established as a force and re-designated Royal Nigerian Navy. The
prefix ‘Royal’ was a mark of allegiance to the Queen of England.
However, on Nigeria’s attainment of a republican status in 1963, the
prefix ‘Royal’ was dropped and this gave birth to the NN. The modern
day NN subsequently came into being legally through the Act of
Parliament No 21 of 1964.
ROLES OF THE NN
8. It is necessary to consider the concept of sea power and
standardized roles of navies before highlighting the roles of the NN.
This would enable one appreciate the roles assigned to the NN from
a better perspective.
CONCEPT OF SEA POWER
9. Sea Power could be defined as ‘the military power that is
brought to bear at sea: on the surface of the sea, underneath it or in
the air above it’. An American strategist, Admiral Alfred T Mahan
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once contended that ‘whoever rules the sea, rules the world’ and that
‘you cannot win any land campaign without securing the sea lanes of
communication to supply the war materials needed on land’.
Examples of this in some modern day operations are the battles for
the Falkland Islands, OPERATION DESERT STORM, and OPERATION
LIBERTY (ECOMOG). It is therefore no accident of history that all
known empires and great industrial nations of today are, without
exception, islands or coastal states who had protected, defended,
harnessed, managed and used their own and other people’s maritime
resources effectively.
STANDARDIZED ROLES OF NAVIES
10. Navies worldwide generally have standardized roles. A maritime
strategist, Ken Booth, categorized such roles into 3, namely: military,
policing and diplomatic.
a. Military Role. The military role consists of:
(1) Projection of force function.
(2) Balance of power function.
b. Policing Role. The policing role is concerned much
more with the territorial waters and as such with the
maintenance of law and order within this area. However, with
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) stretching to 200nm
seaward, there is always the need to extend this role beyond
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the territorial waters. The functions of the navy under this role
are:
(1) Coastguard duties.
(2) Nation building functions.
c. Diplomatic Role. The diplomatic role is concerned with
the management of foreign policy short of the actual
employment of force. The functions of the navy under this
role are:
(1) Negotiation from a position of strength.
(2) Manipulation.
(3) Prestige.
11. With the examination of these roles, it is pertinent to mention
that the navy is the only arm of the armed forces of any nation that
is suitably placed for a diplomatic role. The presence of army tanks or
military aircraft in another country may constitute an act of
aggression, but the visit of another country’s warship is usually seen
as a friendly gesture.
12. In line with the concept of sea power and the standardized
roles of navies worldwide, the responsibilities of the NN can
subsequently be enumerated.
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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NN
13. The Parliamentary Act No 21 of 1964 which legally established
the NN charged the Force with the following responsibilities:
a. The naval defence of Nigeria.
b. Assisting in the enforcement of customs laws.
c. Training in naval duties.
d. Undertaking hydrographic surveys.
e. Such other duties as the Council of Ministers may from
time to time direct.
14. These responsibilities when critically viewed in the light of
changes in the environment, threat perception, new alliances and
defence arrangements reflect a shortfall on the standardized roles of
navies worldwide as earlier enumerated. Hence, there was the need
for the redefinition of these responsibilities. The NN, therefore,
through the recommendation of a committee, forwarded a paper to
the Ministry of Defence for a memorandum to the Government for
the review of the responsibilities enumerated by the Act.
Consequently, the Armed Forces Act Cap A20 Laws of the Federation
of Nigeria charged the NN with the following responsibilities:
a. Enforcing and assisting in coordinating the enforcement
of all Customs Laws including anti-illegal bunkering, fishery and
immigration laws of Nigeria at sea.
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b. Enforcing and assisting in coordinating the enforcement
of national and international maritime laws ascribed or acceded
to by Nigeria.
c. Making of charts and coordination of all national
hydrographic surveys.
d. Promoting, coordinating and enforcing safety regulations
in the territorial waters and EEZ.
e. Any other duty as the President, with the advice of the
National Assembly may from time to time determine.
ORGANIZATION OF THE NN
15. If the traditional missions of navies and, in particular, the basic
roles of the NN which are primarily that of presence, deterrence and
projection of power ashore, are to be sustained, then the NN needs
to be organized to perform policing, military and diplomatic roles.
This implies that the NN should be able to conduct all types of
operations be it under the water, in the air and on the surface.
16. In order to carry out the assigned roles, ships and experienced
men trained in various naval tasks and duties would be required.
Furthermore, the ships would require secure bases, workshops and
dockyard facilities for maintenance and continuous operations.
Additionally, self-sufficiency would be paramount for the
realization of any meaningful state of combat readiness.
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17. In view of the aforementioned considerations, the NN, in her
bid to remain effective operationally, has continued to be dynamic in
her organization and re-organization. Directly under the Naval
Headquarters (NHQ) are 2 operational commands, one training and
one logistics command and 2 autonomous units.
THE NHQ
18. The NHQ is the administrative and policy-making organ of the
NN. At the head is the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) who exercises
full command of the NN. The present CNS is V Adm II Yakubu.
19. To effect full command of the NN, the CNS has 6 staff branches
in addition to the Office of the Navy Secretary. The staff branches
are:
a. Policy and Plans.
b. Training and Operations.
c. Administration.
d. Naval Engineering.
e. Logistics.
f. Accounts and Budget.
20. These branches are headed by Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of
flag rank. It is necessary to consider these branches in details one
after the other.
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21. Policy and Plans Branch. The Policy and Plans (P&P) Branch
is responsible for the formulation, coordination and monitoring of all
policy and planning matters in the NN. The Branch is headed by the
Chief of Policy and Plans. The following directorates are in the
Branch:
a. Directorate of Policy.
b. Directorate of Plans.
c. Directorate of Inspection.
d. Directorate of Ship Design and Acquisition.
e. Directorate of Research and Development.
f. Directorate of Information.
22. Training and Operations Branch. The Training and
Operations Branch is responsible for the formulation, coordination
and monitoring of all naval operations and training policies. It is
headed by the Chief of Training and Operations. The following
Directorates are in the Branch:
a. Directorate of Operations.
b. Directorate of Training.
c. Directorate of Combat Policy and Tactics.
d. Directorate of Naval Signals.
e. Directorate of Naval Intelligence.
f. Directorate of Hydrographic Surveys.
g. Directorate of Maritime Services.
h. Directorate of Air Operations.
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i. Directorate of Information and Communication
Technology.
23. Administration Branch. The Administration Branch looks
after the formulation, coordination and monitoring of administration
policies. The Branch is headed by the Chief of Administration; it has
the following directorates:
a. Directorate of Administration.
b. Directorate of Medical Service.
c. Directorate of Naval Education.
d. Directorate of Naval Provost.
e. Directorate of Legal Services.
f. Directorate of Sports.
g. Directorate of Music.
h. Directorate of Veteran Affairs.
j. Directorate of Chaplaincy (Catholic).
k. Directorate of Chaplaincy (Protestant).
l. Directorate of Islamic Affairs.
24. Naval Engineering Branch. The Naval Engineering Branch is
responsible for the formulation, coordination and implementation of
naval engineering policies. The Chief of Naval Engineering heads the
Branch with the following directorates:
a. Directorate of Construction.
b. Directorate of Air Engineering.
c. Directorate of Marine Engineering.
d. Directorate of Weapon Engineering.
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25. Logistics Branch. The Logistic Branch is responsible for the
formulation of logistic requirement, coordination and monitoring of
NN logistic activities. The Branch is headed by the Chief of Logistics
and comprises:
a. Naval Ordnance Depot.
b. Directorate of Ship Spares.
c. Directorate of Projects.
d. Directorate of Procurement.
e. Directorate of Supplies.
f. Directorate of Armament Supplies.
26. Accounts and Budget Branch. The Accounts and Budget
Branch is responsible for the formulation, coordination, monitoring
and execution of financial regulations and budgetary plans of the NN.
The Branch headed by the Chief of Accounts and Budget has the
following office and directorates:
a. Central Pay Office.
b. Directorate of Naval Accounts.
c. Directorate of Budget.
d. Directorate of Non-Public Fund.
27. Navy Secretary. The Office of the Navy Secretary is
responsible for enlistment/recruitment, appointment, discharge and
resettlement of NN personnel. The office is headed by the Navy
Secretary and it has the following directorates:
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a. Directorate of Manning.
b. Command Naval Drafting.
c. Directorate of Personnel Release.
d. Directorate of Recruitment, Rehabilitation and Reserve.
THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDS
28. The basic requirements for any successful naval engagement
whether against a purely military target or a vessel engaged in illegal
fishing are information, strength and position. The organization of
the NN into 2 operational commands, consisting of the fleets,
formations, operations bases and other units is to achieve maximum
strategic and tactical advantages.
29. Each of the operational command is presently headed by a Flag
Officer of the rank of Rear Admiral, known as the Flag Officer
Commanding (FOC) WEST and EAST respectively. In the Commands’
HQs are 9 PSOs besides the Chief Staff Officer (CSO). These are
Command Operations Officer (COO), Command Technical Officer
(CTO), Command Accounting and Budgeting Officer (CABO),
Command Administration Officer (CAO) and Command Medical
Officer (CMO). Others are the Command Education Officer (CEDO),
Command Intelligence Officer (CINTO), Command Provost Marshal
(CPM) and Command Logistics Officer (CLO. It is therefore important
to examine the 2 operational commands in details as follows:
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a. Western Naval Command. The Western Naval
Command HQ is located at Apapa in Lagos. It covers the sea
and coastal areas from the Nigeria/Benin border at Long 002o
49’ E to Long 006o E in Delta State from the Nigerian coastline
to the limit of the nation’s EEZ. The Command has the
following units under its jurisdiction:
(1) Western Fleet at Apapa.
(2) NNS BEECROFT, an operations base at Apapa.
(3) NNS DELTA, an operations base at Warri.
(4) Naval Air Station, Ojo, Lagos.
(5) Nigerian Navy Reference Hospital,Ojo, Lagos.
(6) Fleet Support Group (West) at Apapa.
(7) NNS WEY, a maintenance unit at Navy Town, Ojo.
(8) Forward Operating Bases (FOB) IGBOKODA and
ESCRAVOS in Ondo and Delta States respectively.
(9) Nigerian Navy Secondary School, Abeokuta.
(10) Nigerian Navy Hospital Warri.
b. Eastern Naval Command. The Eastern Naval
Command (ENC) is the second operations command of the NN
and it covers the sea area from Long 006o E in Delta State to
the Nigeria/Cameroon border at Long 008o 30’ E, and from the
Nigerian coastline to the limit of the nation’s EEZ. The
headquarters is at Calabar. The Command has the following
units under its jurisdiction:
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(1) NNS VICTORY, an operations base at Calabar.
(2) NNS PATHFINDER, an operations base at Port
Harcourt.
(3) Eastern Fleet at Calabar.
(4) FOBs BONNY,EGUWEMA and IBAKA in Rivers,
Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom States respectively.
(5) Fleet Support Group(East) at Calabar.
(6) Navy Hospitals at Calabar and Port Harcourt.
(7) Nigerian Navy Secondary Schools at Calabar and
Port Harcourt.
THE NAVAL TRAINING COMMAND
30. The main functions of the Naval Training Command (NAVTRAC)
are the coordination and harmonization of training doctrines and
standards for all local training in the NN as evolved by the NHQ. The
Command is headed by the FOC NAVTRAC, who is assisted by 9
PSOs namely: the CSO, the Command Technical Training Officer
(CTTO), Command Logistic Training Officer (CLTO) and Command
Medical Training Officer (CMTO). Others are the Command Academic
Training Officer (CATO), CABO, CAO, CINTO and CPM. The units
under NAVTRAC are:
a. Sea Training Unit at Victoria Island, Lagos. It is
responsible for Basic Operations Sea Training, Safety
Operations Sea Training, and Consolidated Operations Sea
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Training of all NN ships when assigned. It also conducts
harbour and ship acceptance trials of vessels after major refits.
b. NNS QUORRA at Apapa, which caters for various forms of
seamen professional courses for officers and ratings.
c Nigerian Navy Engineering College (NNEC) Sapele, which
caters for the technical training of all NN technical personnel.
d. The Nigerian Navy Finance and Logistic School (NNFLS)
at Owerrinta.
e. Nigerian Naval College ONURA and the Nigerian Navy
Basic Training School (NNBTS), which are co-located at
Onne, Port Harcourt. The 2 establishments conduct basic
training for officers and ratings respectively.
f. There are other professional schools, which include; the
Medical Staff Training School, Offa in Kwara State, the NN
School of Music at Otta and the Hydrographic School at Port
Harcourt. Others are the Naval Provost and Regulating School,
the Nigerian Navy Intelligence School and the Physical Training
School all at Apapa, Lagos.
31. It is essential to state that the Command’s relationship with the
Nigerian Defence Academy, the Armed Forces Command and Staff
College and the National Defence College is for liaison only.
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THE LOGISTICS COMMAND
32. The Logistics Command is equally commanded by a FOC of
Rear Admiral rank. The permanent HQ of the Command is at Oghara,
Delta State though it’s presently operating from Sapele. However, the
Nigerian Navy Order establishing the Logistics Command which is
expected to stipulate the organization and responsibilities of the
Command is still been awaited.
THE AUTONOMOUS UNITS
33. The autonomous units are those units, which require prudent
management and high-level control that need not be duplicated or
represented at the lower hierarchy. Though small in outfit, they
report directly to the CNS.
34. Prominent among the autonomous units is the Nigerian Naval
Dockyard, located in Victoria Island, Lagos. Hitherto, third line
maintenance was carried out either in a foreign dockyard or private
ones in Nigeria, at very high cost. The Naval Dockyard in Lagos,
which was commissioned on 27 August 1990, now takes care of
this high level maintenance such as major overhaul of ships engines,
additions and alterations, and modification of designs. The Naval
Shipyard in Port Harcourt was also acquired in 1990 from Messrs Witt
and Bush. Smaller ships of the NN and merchant ships are repaired
there. The shipyard has built and delivered some tugboats and
barges to some private organizations.
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THE NN FLEET
35. The ships in the NN Fleet are grouped into squadrons based on
their type. This is for ease of administration as ships of the same
characteristics when grouped together are easier to administer. The
NN Fleet is made up of the following types of ships:
a. Frigates.
b. Corvettes.
c. Fast Attack Craft (Missile) [FAC (M)]
d. Patrol Craft.
e. Landing Ships
f. Survey Ship.
g. Training Ships
h. Tugs.
i. Inshore Patrol Craft.
j. Mine Counter Measure Vessels.
36. At present, the NN fleet consists of 2 frigates, 2 MK 9
Corvettes, 6 FAC (M), 7 Seaward Defence Boats, 21 Inshore patrol
craft, 2 Landing Ship Tanks (LST) and 2 MCMVs. Also, there are a
number of service vessels, which include one survey ship, 4 oceangoing
tugboats, 4 buoy tenders and some light personnel boats.
Additionally, there are 6 newly acquired Manta Class vessels. These
ships are divided into Western and Eastern Fleets each commanded
by Fleet Commanders who are directly responsible to their respective
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FOCs. This is to ensure administrative and operational control of the
fleets for the effective protection of Nigeria’s western and eastern
maritime flanks.
NAVAL AIR ARM
37. One vital aspect of the NN organization, which requires
separate attention, is the Air Arm. Based on the provision of the
third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
Nigeria has a 200 nm EEZ. With a coastline of over 420 nm, Nigeria,
therefore, has an EEZ of over 84,000 square nautical miles. The size
of the Nigerian Navy Fleet is small compared with the large area she
has to police against potential maritime threats. Thus, it became
necessary to consider practical means of extending the effectiveness
and presence of the country’s naval forces. It is in this regard that
naval helicopters play important roles as a force multiplier in
augmenting the efforts of surface fleets in patrol and reconnaissance.
In pursuance of these advantages, Nigeria acquired some naval
helicopters in 1982, which formed the first squadron of the NN Air
Arm.
38. The NN Air Arm was established in 1985, with the NAS Ojo as
its base. The Air Base was designed to fit the requirement of the NN.
The aircraft types in her inventory are the Lynx and Agusta
helicopters. The NN recently took delivery of 2 new Agusta in
addition to her present fleet and an Agusta Bell 206 Helicopter for
training.
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39. The Lynx helicopter is designed primarily as a weapon carrier in
the ASW role. It is an integral part of the ASW weapon system
onboard NNS ARADU. In addition, the helicopter can carry out:
a. Aerial Surveillance.
b. Search and Rescue.
c. Medical Evacuation.
d. Mine Laying.
e. Logistics Transfer.
40. The Agusta helicopters on the other hand are primarily fitted
for aerial surveillance of the EEZ. However, they could also be used
for movement of Very Important Persons and undertake other
functions such as:
a. Search and Rescue.
b. Medical Evacuation.
c. Mine Laying.
d. Logistic Transfer.
e. Fire Fighting.
ORGANIZATION ONBOARD NN SHIPS
41. There are 4 main departments’ onboard NN ships. These are
operations, marine engineering, weapon engineering and logistics.
An officer, who is referred to as the head of department, is in charge
of each department. He reports directly to the commanding officer
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on operational matters or through the Executive Officer (XO) on all
administrative matters. The XO is the second in command on all
naval ships, as well as being the head of the Operations Department
in smaller ships. However, in bigger ships while the XO remains the
second in command, the Principal Warfare Officer is the head of the
Operations Department. In the ratings cadre, the most senior
seaman rating is referred to as the Coxswain. The Coxswain is
responsible for organizing the ratings for work and discipline.
CONCLUSION
42. The NN from its humble beginning in 1956, as a seaward
defence force has evolved into its present state as a sub-regional
maritime force. At present, the NN has in its inventory, modern
fighting ships equipped with state of the art weapon systems. The
establishment of the NN was predicated upon the need to ensure
national survival and the protection of the nation’s maritime interests.
43. To perform her roles as the caretaker of the nation’s maritime
resources, the NN is organized into 2 operational commands, a
training command and a logistics command. The ships as the basic
fighting elements are organized into types and assigned to the 2
operational commands for ease of administration and operations.
44. The organization of the NN is aimed at achieving maximum
strategic as well as tactical advantages of the 3 elements of
information, position and strength in the NN daily operation.
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Furthermore, in order to ensure that the ships float, move and fight
effectively at all times, the dockyards and other support/logistic
facilities are provided.
45. Finally, it must be stated that the protection of Nigeria’s
maritime environment and the resources therein requires a virile navy
with a balanced fleet. Pandit Nehru, the great Indian Statesman,
once said ‘To be secured on land you must be supreme at sea.’ The
NN remains committed to protecting Nigeria’s citizens as well as the
nation’s assets and interests at sea. Onward Together!</sup>

he History of the Nigerian Army and the Implications for the Future of Nigeria Authors: Fredrick C. Dummar; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

Abstract: Ethnic and religious clashes have continued in Africa's most densely populated nation. Nigeria is a nation of vast human and natural resource potential that has experienced extreme strife during forty years of transition from colonial rule to democratic governance. The central research questions are: How has the historical development of Nigeria's Army effected the development of the nation-state? And how has political engagement changed the army? The first step examined the ethnic, religious factors, and the history of military coups d tat. The second step examined the effect of military governance on education, the economy, and foreign policy. The final step determined the future path of Nigeria and its Army after the birth of Nigeria s third republic. The conclusion recommended an increase in military-to-military contact with Nigeria to increase professionalism and respect for the subordination of the military to civilian authority, along with increased diplomatic efforts to help Nigerians heal the wounds of internal discord that have created the belief that military governance is the answer.